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Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between education and crime from an economic perspec-
tive, developing a human capital-based model that sheds light on key ways in which early childhood
programs and policies that encourage schooling may a®ect both juvenile and adult crime. The pa-
per ¯rst discusses evidence on the e®ects of educational attainment, school quality, and school
enrollment on crime. Next, the paper discusses evidence on the crime reduction e®ects of preschool
programs like Perry Preschool and Head Start, school-age programs that emphasize social and
emotional development, and job training programs for low-skill adolescents and young adults. Fi-
nally, the paper concludes with a broad discussion of education policy and its potential role as a
crime-¯ghting strategy.
1 Introduction
In 1997, over two-thirds of all prison inmates in the U.S. were high school dropouts (Harlow 2003).
Although education policy has not been a major factor driving trends in crime over the past 25
years|high school completion rates have remained relatively stable since the 1980s, while crime has
both risen and fallen dramatically during that time|it is natural to ask what role education policy
does and should play in a®ecting crime rates in the U.S. Put another way, have we struck the right
balance between police, prisons and schools? All three appear to reduce crime, but education and
training have many bene¯ts that prisons and police do not. In fact, Donohue and Siegelman (1998)
argue that well-targeted preschool-type programs might be more cost-e®ective criminal deterrents than
raising incarceration rates. Lochner and Moretti (2004) make a strong case for increasing high school
graduation rates as an alternative to increasing the size of police forces. Yet, accounting for in°ation,
government expenditures on education only increased by a factor of 1.2 between 1980 and 2005, while
expenditures on police and law enforcement rose by a factor of 1.5 and expenditures on corrections
more than tripled (with the largest increase coming in the 1980s).1
¤For their comments and suggestions, I thank David Card, Phil Cook, David Deming, Jens Ludwig, and participants
at the NBER Economics of Crime Control Conferences in Boston, MA, and Berkeley, CA.
1Using the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to adjust for in°ation, expenditures on primary,
secondary, vocational, and higher education were $332.8 billion in 1980, while expenditures on police and corrections
were $37.3 and $15.5 billion, respectively (Tables 417, 455, 490, 499, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1995).
1Despite promising evidence that education-based policies and early childhood interventions can
play an important role in helping reduce crime, evidence is still limited and sometimes mixed. The
link between schooling and crime is more complicated than simple prison statistics suggest. This
chapter reviews evidence in this rapidly growing area and develops a human capital-based theory for
interpreting much of this evidence.
We ¯rst discuss the relationship between education and crime from an economic perspective, devel-
oping a simple model that sheds light on key ways in which early childhood programs and policies that
encourage schooling may a®ect both juvenile and adult crime. The model developed in Section 2 is
grounded in human capital theory and paints with a broad brush. It emphasizes the choice individuals
face between legitimate work and criminal activity, with its associated punishments. By altering the
relative rewards of work and crime, educational investments a®ect decisions to engage in crime. While
the model does not incorporate all avenues through which education may a®ect crime, it serves as a
useful point of reference.
In Section 3, we discuss evidence on the impacts of educational attainment and school qual-
ity/choice on adult crime. The evidence from studies of educational attainment on crime is largely
consistent with a human capital-based theory of crime, suggesting that increases in schooling reduce
most types of adult crime (e.g. Lochner 2004, Lochner and Moretti 2004). Studies of school choice
and increases in school quality paint a more nuanced picture: sizeable improvements in school quality
produce minor (at best) improvements in student achievement and educational attainment, while they
appear to substantially reduce crime during late adolescence and early adulthood (Cullen, Jacob, and
Levitt 2006, Deming 2009a). It is unclear whether `better' schools largely improve social development
or the peers and social networks of disadvantaged youth. We next discuss the contemporaneous rela-
tionship between school attendance and crime. Using exogenous policy changes and other events that
e®ectively force students to stay in school or take extra days o® (e.g. changes in compulsory schooling
laws, teacher in-service days and strikes), a few recent studies have shown that school attendance
a®ects crime in rich and complex ways. Forcing some students to stay in school an extra year or
two reduces both violent and property crime substantially (Anderson 2009), consistent with the time
allocation human capital model developed in Section 2. Yet, day-to-day changes in school attendance
have opposing e®ects on violent and property crime. An extra day of school appears to reduce property
crime while increasing violent crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006). The latter most likely
re°ects social interaction e®ects from bringing together hundreds of adolescents and letting them all
loose at the same time.
Note that total expenditures for corrections in 1980 do not include any municipal-level expenditures. Expenditures on
education, police, and corrections were $725.2, $94.6, and $65.1 billion in 2005 (Tables 481 and 522, Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 2009)
2Section 4 reviews a number of recent studies that examine the long-run impacts of early child-
hood, school-based, and young adult training interventions on juvenile and adult crime. While a few
early preschool programs have produced sizeable long-run reductions in crime { most famously, Perry
Preschool { other quite similar programs have not. School-based programs focused on improving so-
cial development among `risky' children have been shown to reduce crime through early adulthood.
Finally, job training for young adults (e.g. Job Corps) appears to reduce self-reported arrests and
convictions during the period of intensive training, but it yields negligible lasting e®ects on crime.
Altogether, the evidence suggests that reductions in crime can be achieved by a wide range of human
capital-based intervention strategies.
We discuss a number of policy issues related to education and its potential role as a crime-¯ghting
strategy in Section 5 and o®er concluding thoughts in Section 6.
2 The Economics of Education and Crime
Why might education reduce crime, and should its e®ects vary across di®erent types of crimes? How
might education and human capital policies help reduce crime? To answer these questions, we develop
a simple economic model that formalizes a number of key channels through which education may a®ect
crime. We then provide a brief discussion of other factors that may help determine the relationship
between education and crime.
2.1 A Two-Period Model of School, Work, and Crime
To better understand the e®ects of early childhood programs and education policy on criminal behav-
ior, we consider a simple two-period model of human capital investment, work, and crime. The model
developed here abstracts from many things to focus attention on the e®ects of education and human
capital-based policies on crime.2 It emphasizes the role of education as a human capital investment
that increases future legitimate work opportunities, which discourages participation in crime. This is
consistent with numerous recent studies that show that higher wages reduce crime (e.g. Grogger 1998,
Machin and Meghir 2004, Gould, et al. 2002) and decades of research in labor economics showing that
education increases wage rates (see, e.g., Card 1999).
The two key assumptions of this human capital-based approach are (i) individual rationality and (ii)
the fact that crime requires time: in terms of planning, simply `hanging around' waiting for something
to happen, carrying out the activity, avoiding arrest, or incarceration. Regarding the second, a number
of studies discuss the implicit `wage rates' for time spent engaging in property crimes like drug dealing
2For a more detailed treatment of the lifecycle human capital investment problem and the age-crime pro¯le, see
Lochner (2004).
3or burglary.3 Yet, for many other o®enses, especially violent o®enses, the criminal act itself may
require little time; however, expected time in police stations, courtrooms, and prison cells may be
substantial. The total time associated with most criminal acts may, in fact, be dominated by expected
incarceration time. Taking this into account, the expected time associated with many volent o®enses
is likely to exceed that for most property crimes as seen in Table 1 (from Lochner 2004), which reports
probabilities of arrest, probabilities of conviction conditional on arrest, probabilities of incarceration
conditional on conviction, estimated time served if incarcerated, and overall expected time served per
crime committed for common violent and property crimes.
Now, consider the choices faced by adolescents and adults. In the ¯rst period (adolescence),
individuals are assumed to allocate their time to crime (c1 ¸ 0), work (L1 ¸ 0), and human capital
investment (I ¸ 0) subject to the time constraint c1 + L1 + I = 1. In the second period (adulthood),
individuals decide only between crime (c2 ¸ 0) and work (L2 ¸ 0) subject to c2 + L2 = 1. In
considering time spent committing crime, it is useful to think generally about the total expected time
spent planning and committing crimes, avoiding arrest, `hanging around' waiting for an opportunity
to arise, and in court or jail/prison.
While we do not explicitly model childhood, we assume that individuals enter adolescence with a
set of endowments that a®ect subsequent behavior. These endowments may be shaped by early family
and public investments. As a result, they may be manipulated by early childhood interventions as well
as school-based policies (e.g. elementary school quality, preschool programs). We explicitly consider
three types of adolescent `endowments' developed throughout childhood: `learning productivity' A,
initial human capital levels H1, and `criminal propensity' µ. It is useful to think of these three
`endowments' quite generally, as parameters which embody individual characteristics as well as the
environment faced by individuals. For example, A re°ects anything that increases the productivity
of adolescent human capital investments (either through formal schooling or more informal on-the-
job training). This may include raw IQ, peers, or local middle or high school quality. Similarly, µ
represents any factors that may a®ect the net expected returns to crime for an individual (e.g. criminal
skill, preferences for risk, or a personal aversion to crime or prison).
Human capital investments through schooling and training improve adult skills H2:
H2 = H1 + h(I;H1;A); (1)
where h(¢) is increasing in each of its arguments (i.e. hj > 0 for j = I;H1;A) and there are diminishing
marginal returns to investment (i.e. hII < 0). These conditions ensure that education and training
increase human capital at a diminishing rate. We further assume that students with higher levels
3See Freeman (1999) for a survey of this literature.
4of human capital, H1, and learning productivity, A, produce more human capital for any amount of
investment (hIA;hIH > 0). Both ability and initial skill levels are, therefore, complementary with skill
investment.
For each unit of time spent working, Lt, an individual earns Ht. Thus, Ht re°ects an individual's
potential earnings if he devotes all his time to work. Investment, I, has no immediate payo®; however,
it may be subsidized by the government at rate s. These subsidies more generally represent any
incentives the government may provide for schooling or training.
Assume that time spent committing crime each period, ct, yields a net return of N(ct;Ht;µ), where
for simplicity we abstract from uncertainty about punishment.4 As noted earlier, the parameter µ
represents any factors that may a®ect the net returns to crime for an individual. As such, µ is
a function of early childhood investments, family background, and neighborhoods, as well as law
enforcement and incarceration policies. In general, the net expected returns to crime, as well as the
marginal returns to crime Nc, may be positive or negative. However, we assume that Ncµ > 0, so
persons with a high µ have a greater total and marginal expected return from crime.
For criminals, the net marginal return to crime (Nc) must be positive, but this need not be the
case for non-criminals. Many individuals commit crime while working or attending school. This
suggests that Ncc < 0 whenever Nc > 0 (i.e. if net returns to crime increase with the amount of time
spent committing crime, they do so at a diminishing rate).5 We, therefore, make this assumption
throughout.
On the one hand, individuals with more human capital are likely to be better criminals as well
as better workers. (White collar crimes like fraud and embezzlement are perfect examples.) On the
other hand, more highly skilled workers experience greater losses in earnings while imprisoned, and
they may also have a greater aversion to crime (as emphasized by Usher (1993)). The analysis below
assumes that the positive e®ects of human capital on criminal returns weakly outweigh the negative
e®ects on expected costs associated with punishment, so NH ¸ 0, NcH ¸ 0 and NHH · 0. Of course,
human capital is likely to have negligible e®ects on the returns to many property crimes (i.e. NH = 0,
a case not ruled out in our analysis).
2.1.1 The Individual's Decision
Taking (A;H1;µ) and s as given, individuals choose investment and time spent in work and crime to
maximize the present value of lifetime earnings. Assuming a gross interest rate R ¸ 1, and substituting
4We implicitly assume that any expected punishments are incurred during the period the crime is committed. This
is consistent with the fact that most juveniles caught committing crime face relatively short periods of incarceration.
Dealing more explicitly with uncertainty and lags in punishment would not change the nature of most results discussed
here. See Lochner (2004, 2010) for a lifecycle model that explicitly incorporates these features.
5If net marginal returns were positive and increasing, individuals would specialize.
5in the time constraints, individuals
max
I;c1;c2
fH1(1 ¡ I ¡ c1) + sI1 + N(c1;H1;µ)g + R¡1 fH2(1 ¡ c2) + N(c2;H2;µ)g; (2)
subject to the human accumulation equation (1) and the time constraints I ¸ 0, c1 ¸ 0, c2 ¸ 0, and
I + c1 · 1.
While the individual decision problem is framed as an income maximization problem and directly
applies to crimes with a ¯nancial motive, the framework can also be used to study violent crime.
In the case of violent crime, the function N(¢) re°ects the monetary equivalent of any `psychic' or
non-pecuniary bene¯ts from violent crime.
We assume that s < H1, so that investment subsidies are not large enough to make investment
more lucrative than work unless there is some future return on investment. The problem yields the
following interior ¯rst order conditions for I, c1, and c2:
H1 ¡ s = R¡1 [(1 ¡ c2) + NH(c2;H2;µ)]hI(I;H1;A) (3)
H1 = Nc(c1;H1;µ) (4)
H2 = Nc(c2;H2;µ): (5)
These conditions hold for individuals who allocate some time to each activity during adolescence and
adulthood and are useful for studying investment, work, and crime at the intensive margin.6 Individ-
uals equate the marginal returns on investment and crime each period to their potential legitimate
wage rate Ht (less any investment subsidies in the case of investment).7 Because it is ¯xed at any
point in time, this wage rate re°ects the opportunity cost for individuals in choosing how much time
to spend investing in new skills or on the commission of crime. Among adolescents who spend some
time working, small increases in investment (e.g. due to an increase in its return) will come at the
expense of adolescent work and not juvenile crime; juvenile crime will also trade o® with work (at
the margin) and not investment. This suggests that we might not expect signi¯cant `incapacitation'
e®ects of school among students who also participate heavily in the labor market.
Equation (3) shows that schooling provides returns in the form of higher future earnings from
work and potentially from crime through increased human capital. If education does not raise the
returns from crime, youth that plan to spend more time committing crime as an adult will bene¯t
less from school and should, therefore, choose to invest less in their human capital. Thus, a negative
6The second order conditions are not particularly informative. They do require that Ncc < 0, as assumed. While the
second order conditions do not necessarily hold everywhere for all possible parameterizations, we assume that they hold
at any given interior solution for the (local) comparative static results derived below.
7Equations (4) and (5) and diminishing marginal returns to crime (Ncc < 0) are consistent with higher average `wage
rates' for many property crimes (relative to typical legitimate opportunities) as discussed in Freeman (1999).
6relationship between schooling and adult crime may result from individual heterogeneity in tastes for
crime or from local di®erences in criminal opportunities, law enforcement, and punishment regimes.
The e®ect of educational attainment on adult crime is embodied in equation (5). Anything that
increases investment in human capital raises H2, which raises the returns from legitimate work and
the opportunity cost of engaging in crime. Of course, human capital may also raise the return to
crime, so the net e®ect of schooling on adult crime depends on the balance of these two e®ects. In
general, we would expect education to provide greater returns in the labor market than for most types
of crime, so education should reduce adult crime. Notice that individuals with a higher learning ability
A will bene¯t more from school, so we might expect greater reductions in adult crime among smarter
youth in response to school-based policies. Of course, there is little scope for school-based policies to
reduce crime among those who would normally eschew crime as adults in the ¯rst place. As such,
education-based initiatives aimed at adolescents are likely to achieve greater reductions in crime if
they target relatively intelligent (high A) youth with low initial skill levels (H1) and high returns to
crime (i.e. high µ).
For youth with high enough returns to crime or investment such that they choose not to work
at all during adolescence (i.e. I¤ + c¤
1 = 1), conditions (3) and (4) reduce to a single ¯rst order
condition equating the marginal returns on adolescent crime with the marginal returns on investment:
Nc(1¡I;H1;µ)¡s = R¡1 [(1 ¡ c2) + NH(c2;H2;µ)]hI(I;H1;A). Among these individuals, time spent
investing and adolescent crime trade o® one-for-one, so education-based policies may have sizeable
impacts on crime among non-working juvenile criminals.
2.1.2 Education and Early Childhood Policies
We consider the implications of policies which may alter incentives to invest in human capital (i.e.
changes in s), as well as earlier childhood or school-age policies that impact adolescent `endowments'
(A;H1;µ).8 Our results apply to individuals who spend some time in both school and on crime during
adolescence and who spend some time committing crime and working during adulthood. In some
cases, the e®ects of policies di®er (as noted) between individuals who also spend some time working
during adolescence and those who do not.
The following condition is useful for a number of results.
Condition 1. NcH · 1.
This condition implies that human capital does not raise the returns to crime more than it raises
8Policies to improve high schools may also directly a®ect the productivity of time spent in school, A, and socialization,
µ. In this sense, these parameters may be directly manipulated by policy; however, we assume that they are not freely
chosen by adolescents. Of course, families may shape these parameters through earlier investments as discussed above.
7the returns to legitimate work. It may not hold in the case of certain types of white collar crimes, but
it is likely to hold for most common `street' crimes like larceny, assault, or robbery.
We ¯rst discuss the e®ects of education subsidies, or policies that generally encourage schooling.9
Result 1. A marginal increase in education subsidies, s: (i) increases investment in human capital;
(ii) does not a®ect crime for working adolescents but reduces crime among non-working adolescents;
and (iii) reduces adult crime if Condition 1 holds and increases adult crime otherwise.
Education subsidies do not a®ect criminal behavior for adolescents who work, because the amount
of time spent committing crime is determined only by their potential wage rate. Time spent investing
trades o® one-for-one with time spent working.10 Non-working adolescents increase their investment
and reduce their criminal activity in response to higher investment subsidies. For them, criminal
activity necessarily trades o® with investment. As long as the returns to human capital are higher in
the legitimate sector than the criminal sector, education subsidies will reduce adult crime rates.
It is worth noting, however, that crimes with a higher return to skill than legitimate work will tend
to increase (among adults) in response to education subsidies. Thus, it is possible that some forms of
white collar crime may increase following policies that promote skill investments.
Since parental inputs, family background, early childhood programs, and school quality operate on
the `endowment' parameters (A;H1;µ), understanding how these parameters a®ect individual decisions
is important. We begin by studying the e®ects of changes in learning productivity, A.
Result 2. A marginal increase in learning productivity, A: (i) increases investment in human capital
if NHH is su±ciently close to zero; (ii) does not a®ect crime for working adolescents but reduces crime
among non-working adolescents (if NHH ¼ 0); and (iii) reduces adult crime if Condition 1 holds and
increases adult crime otherwise.
Policies that increase learning productivity or cognitive ability have qualitatively similar e®ects
to an increase in education subsidies. Not surprisingly, an increase in the productivity of schooling
(or learning ability) causes individuals to invest more in their skills. Adolescent criminal activity is
una®ected by small changes in A for working adolescents. Since initial potential wage rates are ¯xed,
9All results are derived formally in the Appendix.
10The fact that wage rates are una®ected by hours worked but criminal earnings are declining in time spent committing
crime is key to this result. If wage rates depend on the number of hours worked, time spent committing crime during
adolescence will be a®ected by an investment subsidy even for those who are working. Additionally, if incarceration
extends for many years into the future, an investment subsidy may reduce adolescent crime among workers, since the
expected costs from future incarceration are increasing in investment (Lochner 2004, 2010). Finally, large enough
education subsidies could cause youth to stop working altogether, in which case they would also reduce their criminal
activity.
8individuals simply substitute work for investment.11 More investment means higher levels of human
capital and higher wage rates during adulthood. As long as the criminal returns to human capital
are not too high, this lowers adult crime and increases time spent working. Non-working adolescents
commit less crime in response to an increase in A, since higher investment must trade o® with time
spent committing crime.
Policies that raise initial skill levels (H1) can yield di®erent implications, especially for adolescents.
Result 3. Among working adolescents, an increase initial skill levels, H1, reduces adolescent crime
if Condition 1 holds; otherwise, it increases adolescent crime. Among non-working adolescents, if
human capital does not a®ect the net returns to crime (i.e. NH = 0), then an increase in H1 increases
investment and reduces both adolescent and adult crime.
As long as human capital is rewarded more in the labor market than the criminal sector, an increase
in the skills of working youth reduces juvenile crime. However, it has ambiguous e®ects on investment,
because it raises both the opportunity cost of and return to education. This means that it is not
possible to generally sign the e®ects of changes in H1 on adult human capital and crime for working
youth; however, we would typically expect adult crime to be decreasing in H1. Among non-working
adolescents, increases in skill have no e®ect on the opportunity cost of investment. As such, an increase
in H1 unambiguously raises their investment and reduces their participation in crime at all ages (if
human capital does not a®ect criminal returns).
Finally, we discuss the e®ects of policies that alter the expected returns to crime. These policies
may have their e®ects through socialization or simply through increasing the probability of arrest or
incarceration.
Result 4. A reduction in criminal returns, µ, reduces adolescent crime for working adolescents. If
Condition 1 holds and NHµ · 0, then a reduction in µ also: (i) increases schooling investments; (ii)
reduces adolescent crime for non-working adolescents; and (iii) reduces adult crime.
A lower criminal return directly encourages individuals to work more at all ages. By shifting time
from crime to work during adulthood, a reduction in criminal returns raises the return to investment
(assuming criminal returns to skill are low). Increased schooling investment increases adult wage
rates, which causes individuals to further re-allocate time from crime to work as adults. Thus, the
endogeneity of schooling and work leads to larger reductions in adult crime than would be predicted
if either were held ¯xed.
11As with education subsidies, large increases in A may cause youth to stop working altogether and substitute away
from crime as well. It is also likely that individuals with a higher learning ability also possess a higher initial skill level
H1 by the time they reach adolescence, in which case criminal activity during adolescence would be lower for those with
high A and H1. The e®ects of H1 on crime are discussed further below.
9These results, particularly the last, highlight why cross-sectional comparisons of education and
crime are di±cult to interpret. On the one hand, youth who invest more through school should
commit less crime as adults. On the other hand, youth planning to spend much of their adult lives
on crime (and in jail) receive little return from school and will choose to invest little in school. Thus,
a negative education { crime relationship can arise, because education reduces crime or because a life
of crime renders education useless.
2.2 Other Ways in Which Education May A®ect Crime
Education may also teach individuals to be more patient (Becker and Mulligan 1997). This would
discourage crime, since forward-looking individuals place greater weight on any expected future pun-
ishment associated with their criminal activities. To the extent that time preferences are a®ected by
schooling, crimes associated with long prison sentences (or other long-term consequences) should be
most a®ected. Education may also a®ect preferences toward risk. If schooling makes individuals more
risk averse, it should discourage crime with its greatest e®ects on o®enses that entail considerable un-
certainty in returns or punishment. Finally, schooling may a®ect the set of people individuals interact
with on a daily basis in school, work, or their neighborhoods. Assuming more educated people interact
more with other educated people who are less inclined to engage in crime, this is likely to compound
any reductions in crime associated with schooling.12 In most cases, mechanisms related to changes in
preferences or social interactions suggest that educational attainment is likely to reduce most types of
crime among adults.
2.3 School Attendance and Contemporaneous Crime
It is useful to distinguish between the e®ects of educational attainment on subsequent criminal activity,
and the way in which school attendance itself a®ects contemporaneous crime. The latter relationship
is likely to be driven by three mechanisms. First, school may have an incapacitation e®ect { youth
cannot be in two places at once and many criminal opportunities are more limited in school than on
the streets. Of course, school does not last all day, so this e®ect depends, in part, on the ease with
which youth can engage in crime during non-school hours. This mechanism is inherent in the time
allocation problem above. Second, longer periods of school attendance should increase human capital
levels and improve future employment prospects. This, in turn, may make juvenile arrests and long
periods of detention more costly, reducing incentives to engage in crime while enrolled in school.13
12See Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) for a model of crime where social interactions are important.
13The model above abstracts from this by implicitly assuming that punishments occur in the same period that crimes
are committed and that there are no long-term e®ects of punishment on human capital or employment opportunities;
however, it is straightforward to incorporate these e®ects in a lifecycle model with multi-period punishments as in Lochner
(2004, 2010).
10Third, schools bring hundreds of adolescents together for the day and then let them all loose at the
same time. The social interaction e®ects from doing this are far from obvious, but it is quite possible
that this leads to altercations and more general group-based delinquency. The incapacitation and
human capital e®ects are likely to to imply negative e®ects of school attendance on crime, while the
social interaction e®ect could be positive or negative.
3 Evidence on Education and Crime
We now discuss evidence on the e®ects of educational attainment and school quality and choice on
subsequent criminal outcomes. We also review empirical studies that analyze the relationship between
school attendance and contemporaneous crime.
3.1 Educational Attainment and Crime
We have discussed four primary reasons schooling might a®ect subsequent crime: (i) education raises
wage rates, which raises the opportunity costs of crime; (ii) education may directly a®ect the ¯nancial
or `psychic' rewards from crime; (iii) education may alter preferences for risk-taking or patience; and
(iv) schooling may a®ect the social networks or peers of individuals. For most crimes (except, possibly,
white collar crimes), one would expect these forces to induce a negative e®ect of schooling on adult
crime.
Empirically, there is a strong negative correlation between educational attainment and various
measures of crime. In 1997, 75% of state and 59% of federal prison inmates in the U.S. did not have a
high school diploma (Harlow 2003).14 After controlling for age, state of birth, state of residence, year
of birth and year e®ects, Lochner and Moretti (2004) still ¯nd signi¯cant e®ects of schooling (especially
high school completion) on the probability of incarceration in the U.S. as reported in Figure 1.15 In
2001, more than 75% of convicted persons in Italy had not completed high school (Buonanno and
Leonida 2009), while incarceration rates among men ages 21-25 in the United Kingdom were more
than 8 times higher for those without an education quali¯cation (i.e. dropouts) relative to those with
a quali¯cation (Machin, Marie, and Vujic 2010).
Di®erences by education are also apparent in self-reported survey measures of crime. For example,
in the 1980 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 34% of American men ages 20-
14These ¯gures exclude those who received a General Educational Development (GED) diploma. As shown in Cameron
and Heckman (2003) and Heckman and LaFontaine (2006), individuals with a GED perform like high school dropouts
rather than graduates in the labor market. Roughly 35% of state inmates and 33% of federal inmates completed their
GED with more than two-thirds of these inmates earning their GED while incarcerated. A small percentage of those
who did not receive a high school diploma had participated in some vocational or post-secondary courses. See Harlow
(2003).
15These ¯gures report the coe±cients on indicators for di®erent years of completed schooling from the 1960, 1970, and
1980 Censuses for white and black men ages 20-60.
1123 with 11 or 12 years of completed schooling self-reported earning some income from crime, compared
with 24% of those with 12 years of school, and only 17% of those with more than 12 years. The e®ect of
education is magni¯ed if we consider more active criminal engagement: 4.2% of 20-23 year-old NLSY
men completing 10 or 11 years of school reported earning more than half their income from crime,
compared with 1.4% of those with 12 years and 0.7% of those with at least some college education.
Similar patterns are observed for violent crime in the NLSY. See Lochner (2004) for further details.
Early studies of the relationship between education and crime focused on their correlation con-
ditional on measured individual and family characteristics using standard regression methods.16 For
example, Witte and Tauchen (1994) ¯nd no signi¯cant relationship between educational attainment
and crime after controlling for a number of individual characteristics. Grogger (1998) estimates a
signi¯cant negative e®ect of wages on crime, but he ¯nds no relationship between years of completed
schooling and crime after controlling for individual wage rates. Of course, increased wages and earn-
ings are important consequences of schooling. Thus, this study suggests that education may indirectly
reduce crime through increased wage rates.
These earlier studies must be interpreted with caution. A negative cross-sectional correlation be-
tween education and crime, even after controlling for measured family background and neighborhood
characteristics, does not necessarily imply that education reduces crime. Standard regression studies
are unlikely to estimate the causal e®ect of eduction on crime (i.e. the e®ect of increasing someone's
schooling on his criminal activity) for a number of reasons. First, unobserved individual character-
istics like patience or risk aversion are likely to directly a®ect both schooling and criminal decisions.
Individuals who choose more schooling (even after conditioning on observable characteristics) might
also choose less crime regardless of their education level, in which case regression-based estimates do
not identify a causal e®ect. Second, using variation in crime and education across states or local
communities may also produce biased estimates. Governments may face a choice between funding
police or good public schools, which would tend to produce a spurious positive correlation between
education and crime. Alternatively, unobserved characteristics about communities or their residents
may directly a®ect the costs or bene¯ts of both education and crime. For example, communities with
few job opportunities that reward schooling may also be faced with severe gang problems. While it is
often possible to account for permanent unobserved di®erences across communities by examining the
relationship between changes in schooling and crime over time, this approach does not account for the
e®ects of changing unobserved community characteristics. Third, reverse causality is another impor-
tant concern, for reasons discussed in Section 2. Individuals who plan to heavily engage in crime (e.g.
because they are particularly good at it, enjoy it, or live in areas with plenty of illicit opportunities)
16Ehrlich (1975) provides an early empirical exploration of predicted e®ects of education on crime from a human capital
perspective. See Witte (1997) for a survey of the early empirical literature on education and crime.
12are likely to choose to leave school at a young age. Arrests or incarceration associated with juvenile
crime may also cause some youth to drop out of school early (Hjalmarsson 2008).
Recently, economists have attempted to address these di±cult issues and to estimate the causal
e®ects of schooling on crime using instrumental variable (IV) methods. In the context of estimating
the e®ect of educational attainment on crime, an instrument is valid if it induces variation in schooling
but is uncorrelated with other factors that directly a®ect criminal proclivity (e.g. individual prefer-
ences or abilities, local law enforcement). Intuitively, this approach exploits di®erences in educational
attainment across individuals that arise in response to factors that have no direct impact on criminal
decisions. An ideal instrument would randomly assign some youth to drop out of high school and
others to ¯nish. Then, comparing the di®erences in crime rates across these groups would identify the
causal e®ect of high school completion on crime. In practice, we typically do not observe such perfect
experiments, but researchers can sometimes come close.
Because crime itself is di±cult to measure, researchers are often forced to use measures of arrest or
incarceration rather than actual crimes committed. It is possible that education reduces the probability
of arrest and incarceration or the sentence lengths administered by judges, in which case estimates
based on measures of arrest or incarceration incorporate these e®ects in addition to any e®ects of
education on actual crime. While there is little direct evidence on these issues, Mustard (2001) ¯nds
negligible e®ects of defendant education levels on the sentence lengths they receive. Furthermore,
results using self-reported measures of crime in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
support the case that education reduces actual violent and property crime and not just the probability
of arrest or incarceration conditional on crime (Lochner 2004, Lochner and Moretti 2004).17
Many recent empirical studies analyze crime aggregated at some geographic level, exploring the
e®ects of average educational attainment on crime, arrest, conviction, or incarceration rates. In order
to address concerns with endogeneity or unobserved heterogeneity, researchers have typically turned
to instrumental variables estimation or a di®erences-in-di®erences strategy using changes in state or
national rules that a®ect schooling decisions. An aggregate-level regression is often speci¯ed as follows:
ycalt = ¯Ealt + °Xalt + dlt + dcl + dal + dct + dat + dca + "calt (6)
where ycalt is a measure of the crime, arrest, or incarceration rate for some o®ense type c, age group
a, in location l, in year t. In some cases, only a single measure of crime is used (e.g. incarceration or
17There has been considerable debate among criminologists on the merits of self-reported measures of crime vs. o±cial
measures of arrest. Most studies ¯nd a reasonably high correlation between the two; however, it is generally agreed that
the two measures o®er distinct and complementary information about criminal activity. Comparisons of self-reported
arrests vs. o±cial arrests tend to ¯nd a stronger correlation, with agreement increasing further for self-reported vs.
o±cial measures of criminal convictions. A number of studies report greater under-reporting of crimes and arrests by
blacks; however, studies vary considerably on this. See the classic Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis (1981) for comprehensive
treatment of the issue or Thornberry and Krohn (2000) for a more recent survey of this literature.
13total arrests), in which case the c subscript is extraneous. Ealt is an aggregate measure of educational
attainment for age group a in location l at time t (e.g. average schooling attainment or high school
completion rates). Xalt is a set of observable characteristics that may vary across age, location,
and time (e.g. racial composition of an area). The d's represent indicator variables that account for
unobserved di®erences by age/cohort, location, year, and criminal o®ense types. The term dlt allows for
location-speci¯c time e®ects, which accounts for time varying unobserved location-speci¯c di®erences
that may re°ect di®erences in local public spending, economic conditions, or law enforcement. The
inclusion of dcl allows the average distribution of crime or arrest types to di®er across areas. For
example, some states may focus arrests more heavily on one type of crime, while others focus on
other types. Or, some areas may be more amenable to certain crimes while others are not. Similarly,
the age distribution of crime or arrests need not be the same across areas { some age groups may
be more crime-prone in some areas or arrest policies with respect to age may di®er across areas.
The term dal absorbs long-run di®erences in age-arrest patterns across locations. Crime-speci¯c and
age-speci¯c time trends in arrest common to all areas are accounted for by dct and dat, respectively.
Finally, dca accounts for long-term di®erences in age-crime pro¯les across di®erent types of criminal
o®enses. Given these ¯xed e®ects, identi¯cation of the e®ect of education on crime is achieved through
time variation in cohort educational attainment levels across di®erent locations. The absence of dalt
indicator variables in equation (6) is, therefore, central to identi¯cation.
Lochner and Moretti (2004) examine state-level male arrest rates by criminal o®ense and age (¯ve-
year age categories beginning at ages 20-24 through 55-59) from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR) for the U.S. in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. This data is linked to 1960-90 decennial U.S.
Census data on educational attainment and race to estimate equation (6), where ycalt represents log
arrest rates for a speci¯c o®ense, age category, state, and Census year. They speci¯cally analyze arrest
rates for murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson. In using log arrest
rates, the e®ect of education is assumed to be the same in percentage terms for each type of crime
included in the regression. They explore the e®ects of both average years of schooling and high school
completion rates at the cohort-level (cohorts are de¯ned by year of birth given year t and age a) in
state l as of time t (i.e. Ealt). In addition to including all the d ¯xed e®ects in equation (6), they also
include the percent of males that are black in age group a living in state l at time t (i.e. Xalt).
The main methodological contribution of Lochner and Moretti (2004) is the use of changes in state-
speci¯c compulsory schooling laws over time as instrumental variables for schooling.18 Intuitively, this
strategy measures the extent to which an increase in a state's compulsory schooling age leads to an
immediate increase in educational attainment and reduction in subsequent crime rates for a®ected
18The relevant compulsory schooling age is based on the state law that applied when a cohort was age 14.
14cohorts. Lochner and Moretti's (2004) analysis suggests that changes in compulsory schooling laws
are exogenous and not related to prior trends in schooling or state expenditures on law enforcement,
so it appears to be a valid instrument. Other studies reach similar conclusions about the exogenous
nature of changes in compulsory schooling laws in other contexts (e.g. Acemoglu and Angrist 2001,
Lleras-Muney 2002).
Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate equation (6) using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Using OLS, they ¯nd that a one-year increase in average
education levels in a state reduces state-level arrest rates by 11 percent. IV estimates suggest slightly
larger e®ects, although they are not statistically di®erent. These estimated e®ects are very similar
to the predicted e®ects derived from multiplying the estimated increase in wages associated with an
additional year of school by the estimated e®ects of higher wage rates on crime (from Gould, et al.
2002). This suggests that much of the e®ect of schooling on crime may come through increased wage
rates and opportunity costs as emphasized in the model of Section 2. Given the strong relationship
between high school completion and incarceration apparent in Figure 1, Lochner and Moretti (2004)
also estimate speci¯cations using the high school completion rate as a measure of schooling. OLS
estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in high school graduation rates would reduce
arrest rates by 7%, while IV estimates suggest a slightly larger impact of 9%.
Lochner and Moretti (2004) also estimate separate e®ects of education for di®erent types of crime
using OLS (including interactions of criminal o®ense type with education in equation (6)). These
results suggest similar e®ects across the broad categories of violent (murder, rape, robbery, and assault)
and property (burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson) crime | a one year increase in average
years of schooling reduces both property and violent crime by about 11-12%. However, the e®ects
vary considerably within these categories. A one-year increase in average years of schooling reduces
murder and assault by almost 30 percent, motor vehicle theft by 20 percent, arson by 13 percent, and
burglary and larceny by about 6 percent. Estimated e®ects on robbery are negligible, while those
for rape are signi¯cantly positive. Additional speci¯cations suggest quantitatively similar e®ects for a
10-20 percentage point increase in high school graduation rates. Their results for rape are surprising
and not easily explained by standard economic models of crime.19
Lochner (2004) follows a very similar approach using the same UCR data from 1960 to 1980;
however, he also examines white collar crime. OLS estimation of equation (6) produces positive,
though statistically insigni¯cant, e®ects of schooling on arrest rates for white collar crimes (forgery
and counterfeiting, fraud, and embezzlement). Estimates for violent and property crime are negative
and similar to those of Lochner and Moretti (2004).
19However, the results are consistent with some speci¯cations in Gould, et al. (2002), which suggests that local wage
rates are positively correlated with local crime rates for rape.
15Lochner and Moretti (2004) also use individual-level data on incarceration and schooling from
the 1960, 1970, and 1980 U.S. Censuses to estimate the e®ects of educational attainment on the
probability of imprisonment separately for black and white men (ages 20-60). Their estimates control
for age of the respondent (three-year age categories), state of birth, state of residence, cohort of birth,
and state-speci¯c year e®ects. Most importantly, controlling for state-speci¯c year e®ects allows for
the possibility that di®erent states may have di®erent time trends for law enforcement policies or
may simply exhibit di®erent trends in aggregate criminal activity. Analogous to their analysis of
state-level arrest rates, they use state-level changes in compulsory schooling ages as an instrument for
educational attainment. Although this analysis uses individual-based measures of incarceration and
schooling, variation in schooling laws at the state-year level e®ectively identi¯es the e®ect of education
on crime. As with the estimates for aggregate arrest rates, identi¯cation comes from the fact that in
any given state and year, di®erent age cohorts faced di®erent compulsory schooling laws during their
high school years, causing them to acquire di®erent levels of schooling and to commit crime at di®erent
rates. Again, both OLS and IV estimates are very similar and suggest that, on average, an extra year
of education reduces the probability of imprisonment by slightly more than .1 percentage point for
whites and by about .4 percentage points for blacks. In their sample, the probability of incarceration
for male whites (blacks) without a high school degree averaged .83% (3.6%), which translates into a
10-15% reduction in incarceration rates for both white and black males associated with an extra year of
completed schooling. These estimated e®ects are comparable to those for arrest rates described earlier.
OLS results suggest that completion of the twelfth grade causes the greatest drop in incarceration,
while their is little e®ect of schooling beyond high school (see Figure 1).
Oreopolous and Salvanes (2009) reproduce the Lochner and Moretti (2004) IV results for black
males using the same estimation strategy with a slightly di®erent speci¯cation and an expanded
sample that includes men ages 25-64 from the 1950-80 U.S. Censuses.20 Their estimate suggests that
an additional year of completed schooling reduces incarceration rates among black men by about 20%.
Machin, Marie, and Vujic (2010) exploit two national changes in minimum schooling ages in the
United Kingdom (taking place in 1947 and 1973) to estimate the e®ects of schooling on criminal con-
victions for property crimes over the period 1984-2002. Identi¯cation for their IV estimates e®ectively
comes from two separate cohort-level di®erences in schooling attainment and crime for cohorts sur-
rounding the law changes.21 Among men, they estimate that a one-year increase in average schooling
20Most notably, they do not include state and state-speci¯c year e®ects in their speci¯cation. They also remove
individuals with greater than twelve years of schooling from their sample. Their measures of compulsory schooling ages
di®er as well, incorporating the fact that some states allow for exceptions to the dropout age under certain conditions.
21They estimate models aggregated to the year-age level for individuals ages 16-59 from 1984-2002. To alleviate
concerns that other important economic or social factors may have changed around the same time as the two increases in
compulsory schooling ages, they include a rich set of covariates: year and age indicators, fraction male, fraction employed,
fraction non-white, and fraction living in London.
16levels reduces conviction rates for property crime by about 30%, more than twice the e®ect estimated
by Lochner and Moretti (2004) for the U.S.
Buonanno and Leonida (2009) estimate the e®ects of educational attainment on crime rates in
Italy using regional panel data from 1980-95. Their unit of observation is a region-year (they examine
20 Italian regions), and they estimate a restricted form of equation (6) using OLS. Speci¯cally, they
control for region and time ¯xed e®ects (dl and dt), along with region-speci¯c quadratic time trends
(assuming dlt = ±1lt+±2lt2), and a rich set of time-varying region-speci¯c covariates.22 These estimates
are identi¯ed from the relationship between changes in regional education levels and crime rates
(around smooth regional time trends). Their estimates suggest that a ten percentage point increase in
high school graduation rates would reduce property crime rates by 4% and total crime rates by about
3%. (E®ects on property crime are statistically signi¯cant, while e®ects on total crime are not.) They
¯nd no evidence to suggest that university completion reduces crime.23
Merlo and Wolpin (2009) take a very di®erent approach to estimating the relationship between
schooling and subsequent crime. Using individual-level panel data on black males ages 13-22 from the
NLSY, they estimate a discrete choice vector autoregression model in which individuals can choose to
engage in crime, attend school, and/or work each year.24 These decisions are allowed to depend on
unobserved individual-speci¯c returns to each activity, as well as crime, schooling, and work choices
the previous year. Using estimates for their model, Merlo and Wolpin simulate the e®ects of changing
youth schooling status at age 16 on subsequent outcomes. Their estimates suggest that, on average,
attending school at age 16 reduces the probability a black male ever commits a crime over ages 19-22
by 13 percentage points and the probability of an arrest over those ages by 6 percentage points. These
represent 42% and 23% reductions in self-reported crime and arrest rates, respectively, for black males
not in school at age 16.
A ¯nal study worth mentioning examines the e®ects of an explicit education subsidy on youth
burglary rates in England. Between 1999 and 2002, England piloted Educational Maintenance Al-
lowances (EMA), which provided subsidies of up to $40 per week (plus bonuses for completion of
coursework) for low-income 16-18 year old youth to attend school. The program was administered in
15 local areas with low schooling participation rates. During the same time period, the Reducing Bur-
glary Initiative (RBI) funded 63 di®erent local burglary reduction schemes as a separate pilot project.
22Covariates include employment rates, GDP per capita, GDP growth rates, average wage rates, the fraction of crimes
without an arrest, police per capita, and the length of time in the judicial process.
23Buonanno and Leonida (2009) also generalize their econometric speci¯cation to allow for an e®ect of lagged crime rates
on current crime rates, estimating this using a generalized method of moments estimator to account for the endogeneity
of lagged crime rates. This speci¯cation produces similar estimated e®ects of schooling on crime.
24Crime, work, and school are not mutually exclusive activities in this framework { individuals can do any combination
of these three activities in each year. An individuals is said to have engaged in crime in any year if they self-reported
any of the following o®enses: theft, other property crime, sold drugs, or assault.
17Roughly half of all EMA pilot areas were also selected for the RBI. Sabates and Feinstein (2007) use
a di®erences-in-di®erences strategy to identify the e®ects of each pilot program as well as the combi-
nation of the two on burglary. Speci¯cally, they compare changes in burglary conviction rates before
and after the introduction of RBI, EMA, or both against a set of comparison areas. While baseline
burglary conviction rates were much higher in EMA and EMA-RBI combined areas relative to the
comparison areas, annual growth rates in burglary conviction rates prior to the programs were quite
similar across all three classi¯cations. To reduce concerns about di®erences between the treated and
untreated areas, Sabates and Feinstein control for a number of time-varying area-speci¯c factors likely
to a®ect crime and limit their sample of comparison areas to those that best `match' the distribution of
demographic characteristics in the pilot areas.25 Their ¯ndings suggest that the combination of both
the EMA and RBI signi¯cantly reduced burglary rates by 1.3 per 1,000 youth (about 5.5%) relative
to the `matched' comparison areas. E®ects of the EMA alone were slightly lower but still signi¯cant.
While there are obvious concerns about the extent to which time-varying determinants of burglary are
the same for treated and comparison areas, Sabates and Feinstein (2007) show that estimated e®ects
on burglary rates for 19-21 year olds (who were not o®ered the education subsidy) were much lower
and statistically insigni¯cant.
3.2 School Quality and Crime
If human capital acquisition, socialization, or preference modi¯cation are important mechanisms de-
termining the impacts of educational attainment on crime, then it is likely that school quality and
the type of schools students attend also a®ect criminal behavior. While there are no studies which
directly estimate the e®ects of measured school quality on crime, three recent studies on school choice
and desegregation provide some useful insights.
Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) and Deming (2009a) examine the importance of school choice
in large urban U.S. school districts (Chicago and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, respectively) on a variety
of student outcomes, including delinquency and crime. Both studies examine the e®ects `winning' a
randomized lottery for admission to schools children selectively apply to.26 By comparing the outcomes
for youth who win vs. lose a particular school admission lottery, they estimate the e®ects of being
o®ered admission to that school relative to the preferred alternative. This re°ects the `intention to
treat' (i.e. the e®ects of being o®ered the opportunity to attend better schools) and not necessarily
25Their regressions control for unemployment rates for individuals under 25, proportion of students eligible for free
school meals, number of quali¯ed teachers, pupil-teacher ratios, and the number of supplementary sta® for ethnic mi-
norities, percent of youth with no schooling quali¯cations as of age 16 (i.e. dropouts), and the percent of unauthorized
half-days missed in secondary school. We discuss results based on the `matched' sample of comparison areas.
26In both cases, students could always choose to attend their neighborhood school. If any additional positions were
available in a school, an open enrollment lottery was run based on all other students who applied to that school/program.
Lotteries were random within population subgroups (e.g. by race or family income).
18the e®ects of actually attending that school, since many students did not ultimately enroll in schools
for which they were admitted by lottery. However, both studies ¯nd that `winning' a lottery does
signi¯cantly increase enrollment in that school. Since many students applying outside their assigned
local school are from disadvantaged backgrounds and neighborhoods, on average, lottery winners end
up attending better quality schools, as measured by such things as student achievement scores, value
added (i.e. growth in achievement), student behavioral problems, or teacher quality. In this sense, these
studies o®er an opportunity to examine the e®ects of school quality, broadly de¯ned, on delinquency
and crime.
Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) ¯nd that winning a high school lottery in Chicago signi¯cantly
raises peer graduation rates by 6% and the share of peers who test above national norms by about
14%; however, lottery winners appear to be placed in lower tracked classes within the better schools.
Interestingly, they ¯nd no evidence that lottery winners perform better on a wide range of academic
measures (e.g. math and reading tests, enrollment, days absent) and some evidence that they are more
likely to drop out of high school. The latter may be due to a mismatch between student ability and
school demands. Despite the disappointing ¯ndings regarding academic outcomes, students who won
lotteries to high achievement Chicago public schools reported nearly 60% fewer arrests on a ninth
grade student survey. These winners also reported getting into less trouble at school, and school
administrative data suggests that they had lower incarceration rates during school ages. Of course,
it is possible that schools themselves a®ect student arrest and incarceration rates through di®erential
disciplinary policies (or criminal opportunities), so it is important to study whether these reductions
in arrests/incarceration persist beyond high school.
To this end, Deming (2009a) examines the impacts of open enrollment lotteries (for middle and
high schools) on adult criminal outcomes seven years after random assignment.27 Given his interest
in the e®ects of school choice on crime, he categorizes males based on their likelihood of arrest, which
he estimates as a function of demographic characteristics, earlier math and reading test scores, and
other school-related behaviors at young ages. For his entire sample of middle and high school lottery
participants, `high-risk' youth (de¯ned as those in the top quintile of predicted arrest probability) have
seven times more felony arrests (seven years after random assignment) than the average student from
the bottom four quintiles combined.
Like Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006), Deming (2009a) estimates signi¯cant e®ects of winning a
school lottery on the quality of school attended, especially among `high-risk' youth, but no e®ects on
achievement tests. There appears to be some e®ect on student enrollment during high school years,
27He merges Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district data with data on adult (ages 16+) arrests and incarceration from
Mecklenburg County and the North Carolina Department of Corrections.
19but there is no evidence that `high-risk' lottery winners are more likely to graduate from high school.28
Among high school lottery winners in the high-risk category, Deming (2009a) estimates a signi¯cant
0.35 (roughly 45%) reduction in the number of adult felony arrests (cumulative as of seven years after
the lottery) with an associated savings in victimization costs of $4,600-16,600.29 Because many crimes
do not lead to an arrest, the total bene¯ts to potential victims and society are likely to be much larger.
His estimates suggest that winning middle school lotteries also reduces crime among high-risk youth
with most e®ects of a similar order of magnitude.
Court-ordered school desegregation policies enacted since Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka
in 1954 dramatically altered the types of schools blacks attended in many American districts. In
most cases, the resources and average student achievement of schools attended by blacks would have
improved markedly.30 Guryan (2004) estimates that these desegregation e®orts signi¯cantly increased
high school graduation rates among blacks by 2-3 percentage points but had no e®ect on white grad-
uation rates. Weiner, Lutz and Ludwig (2009) examine whether these changes a®ected county-level
homicide rates.31 Their estimates suggest that homicide deaths among blacks ages 15-19 declined
by 17% in the ¯rst ¯ve years after court-ordered desegregation, while homicide deaths among white
15-19 year olds declined by about 23%. Homicide deaths among slightly older whites and blacks also
declined. In looking at o®enders, they ¯nd that arrest rates for homicide declined by one-third for
blacks ages 15-19, while there was no decline for young whites. Combining Guryan's (2004) estimated
e®ect on high school graduation rates with the estimated e®ects of schooling on crime from Lochner
and Moretti (2004), they argue that much of the e®ect may be coming from the increased schooling
among blacks associated with desegregation.
For some perspective, it is interesting to compare these ¯ndings with those from the Moving-to-
Opportunity (MTO) experiment, which provided housing vouchers to low-income families to move
out of high poverty neighborhoods. Evaluations of MTO report that families receiving the housing
vouchers moved into neighborhoods with about 25% lower poverty rates; however, these moves only
led to modest improvements in the quality of schools youth attended and no improvements in their
cognitive achievement (Sanbonmatsu, et al. 2006). Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005) report that the
MTO housing vouchers led to lasting reductions in arrests for both violent and property o®enses
among young females, short-term reductions in violent crime arrests for males, and delayed increases
28There is more evidence of e®ects on high school graduation and college attendance among the lower risk quintiles.
29These victimization costs (in year 2009 dollars) assign costs based on the type of o®ense using cost estimates from
Miller, Cohen and Wiersema (1996). They do not include justice system or enforcement costs. The larger ¯gure uses a
cost of $4.3 million for murder while the smaller uses a value of $125,000 (twice the cost of rape).
30For example, Reber (2007) shows that integration e®orts in Louisiana from 1965-70 were accompanied by large
increases in per pupil funding for black students.
31They use data on homicide death by year and county over the period 1958-88 from vital statistics and data on
homicide victims and arrestees from the Supplemental Homicide Report from 1976-2003.
20in property crime arrests for males. Overall, any reductions in crime were modest at best.
Taken together, these studies suggest that simply improving the schools attended by disadvantaged
youth appears to be much more successful in reducing criminal activity (though not necessarily in
improving academic outcomes) than changing neighborhoods. Given the mixed ¯ndings on educational
attainment levels (with modest positive e®ects at best), the impacts of better schools on crime appear
to be driven largely by school quality and not `quantity'. Whether it is the quality of teachers and
instruction or of student peers is less obvious. The fact that test scores did not improve among lottery
winners suggests that the main e®ects of attending `better' schools on delinquency and crime are likely
to be attributed to better socialization, better peer interactions, improvements in non-cognitive skills,
or changes in preferences. It is, therefore, interesting that substantial improvements in `neighborhood
peers' do not yield the same bene¯ts in terms of crime reduction.
3.3 Contemporaneous Schooling and Crime
We now consider the relationship between contemporaneous schooling and crime. As noted earlier,
there are three main ways in which altering youth's schooling attendance is likely to a®ect their con-
temporaneous engagement in crime: (i) incapacitation, (ii) raising the costs of future punishment
through human capital accumulation, and (iii) social interactions facilitated by bringing youth to-
gether. The incapacitation and human capital e®ects of schooling on crime are likely to be negative,
while the sign of the social interaction e®ect is theoretically ambiguous.
Three relatively recent studies shed light on these e®ects by estimating the impacts of di®erent
`interventions' that directly a®ect youth schooling attendance.32 Anderson (2009) examines the e®ects
of increasing state compulsory schooling ages on crime among a®ected youth (i.e. forcing some youth
to stay in school), while Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) estimate the e®ects of extra
days o® from school due to teacher in-service days or teacher strikes (i.e. keeping youth out of school).
The policies analyzed by these studies di®er in two important respects. First, increases in compulsory
schooling ages typically `require' students to stay in school at least one additional year and sometimes
more, whereas teacher in-service days and strikes are of very short duration. Second, while teacher
strikes and in-service days release all students from school, changes in compulsory schooling laws
typically a®ect a small set of marginal students. All three potential e®ects of school attendance on
crime are likely to be relevant to changes in compulsory schooling, while the e®ects of in-service
days and teacher strikes are likely to be limited to incapacitation and social interactions. Any social
interaction e®ects are likely to be magni¯ed in the latter cases due to the universal nature of the policy.
32Using individual-level data, earlier studies by Gottfredson (1985), Farrington, et al. (1986), and Witte and Tauchen
(1994) explore the cross-sectional relationship between time spent in school and contemporaneous crime, concluding that
time spent in school signi¯cantly `reduces' criminal activity. Unfortunately, these ¯ndings are di±cult to interpret given
the simultaneous nature of the crime and schooling choices.
21Rather than use changes in compulsory schooling laws as instruments for educational attainment,
Anderson (2009) estimates the direct e®ect of these laws on contemporaneous county-level arrest rates
(from the UCR) from 1980 to 2006 among a®ected youth ages 16-18. Speci¯cally, his estimates are
identi¯ed from within-county °uctuations in arrests (around county-speci¯c trends) for 16-18 year-olds
(relative to 13-15 year-olds) over time as state compulsory schooling ages change.
Anderson's estimates for total arrest rates imply that a compulsory schooling age of 17 signi¯cantly
reduces age 17 arrests by about 8% (5.4 arrests per 1,000 youth) compared to a compulsory schooling
age of 16 or less. Similarly, an age 18 compulsory schooling age signi¯cantly reduces arrests by 9.7-
11.5% at ages 16-18. Separating arrests by type of o®ense, he estimates that compulsory schooling laws
signi¯cantly reduce both property and violent arrests for 16-18 year olds. Although, estimated e®ects
of schooling age laws on drug-related crimes are sizeable, the e®ects are typically not statistically
signi¯cant. Overall, the estimates generally suggest that forcing youth to spend an extra year or two
in high school signi¯cantly reduces their arrest rates over that period.
Jacob and Lefgren (2003) examine the e®ects of single day changes in school-wide attendance on
juvenile crime and arrest rates in 29 large American cities from 1995 to 1999. Exploiting teacher
in-service days across jurisdictions over time as an exogenous source of variation in school days, they
essentially compare local juvenile crime rates on days when school is not in session to those when it is.33
Their ¯ndings suggest that an additional day of school reduces serious juvenile property crime by about
14% that day while it increases serious juvenile violent crime by 28%. These results are consistent with
an `incapacitation e®ect' of school that limits participation in property crime. However, the increased
level of interaction among adolescents facilitated through schools may raise the likelihood of violent
con°icts (and other minor delinquency) after school. Interestingly, they ¯nd no evidence to suggest
that school days simply shift crime to other days without changing overall crime rates.
Luallen (2006) follows a similar approach, using teacher strikes (typically lasting about 5 days)
rather than in-service days as an exogenous source of school days. Using data from the state of
Washington for 1980-2001, Luallen (2006) estimates that an extra day of school reduces arrests for
property crimes by about 29% while increasing arrests for violent crimes by about 32% in urban areas.
The e®ect on property crime is roughly double the e®ect estimated in Jacob and Lefgren (2003), while
the e®ect on violent crime is quite similar. In rural and suburban areas, Luallen ¯nds insigni¯cant
e®ects on both violent and property crime arrests. Thus, the incapacitation and social interaction
e®ects appear to be particularly strong in urban areas and negligible elsewhere.
33Their main speci¯cation includes controls to account for the possibility that crime may be higher on certain days of
the week or that di®erent cities may experience di®erent monthly crime cycles.
224 Evidence on Human Capital-Based Interventions from Birth to
Young Adulthood
A growing body of evidence suggests that early childhood and school-age interventions can reduce
adult crime rates. Most famously, the High/Scope Perry Preschool Program substantially lowered
arrest rates through age 40 for a sample of low-income minority children in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
Several other early childhood interventions have produced similar e®ects on delinquency; however,
others have not. We brie°y review studies of early childhood and school-age interventions that have
analyzed educational and criminal/delinquency outcomes during late adolescence or adulthood.34 We
then discuss a few programs aimed at improving school participation among adolescents or that directly
provide training to adolescents and young adults.
Table 2 summarizes four small-scale early childhood interventions (Abecedarian Project, Chicago
Child Parent Center (CPC), High/Scope Perry Preschool, and Infant Health and Development Pro-
gram (IHDP)), their target populations, study methodology, and estimated e®ects on educational
attainment and crime at ages 18 or older. All of the programs included a preschool component, rang-
ing from full-time full-year care from birth to kindergarten (Abecedarian) to half-day preschool at ages
3 and 4 (Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool). Perry Preschool and IHDP also included regular home
visits at preschool ages as part of their curriculums.35 All of the programs targeted youth facing some
form of disadvantage. Abecedarian and Perry Preschool speci¯cally targeted children at-risk of having
problems developing normally in school. Children enrolling in the Chicago CPC were all minorities
selected from families with low socioeconomic status (SES). IHDP drew from a more heterogeneous
population, targeting pre-term children born of low birth-weight (less than 2500g). Overall, these stud-
ies cover a reasonably broad range of potential preschool-based interventions and target populations.
(We discuss ¯ndings for Head Start below.)
Youth from all four of these programs were followed until at least age 18, enough time to determine
whether the programs have medium-term e®ects on the education and criminal behavior of partici-
pants. Only the Chicago CPC was not evaluated using randomized trials; however, Reynolds, et al.
(2001) use a strong design of matching treated children with other comparison children based on age of
kindergarten entry, eligibility for and participation in government funded programs, and neighborhood
and family poverty. Children from the matched comparison sample would also have been eligible for
the program had they lived in a neighborhood with a center. Sample sizes range from around one
34See Karoly, et al. (1998) or Blau and Currie (2006) for more comprehensive surveys of early childhood programs.
35All of the programs typically provided other additional services to families and children (e.g. nutritional and health
services). While a subsample of the Abecedarian participants received an extended school-age intervention for the ¯rst
few years of school, we focus on the preschool component of the program. The additional school-age services did not
substantially impact the educational attainment or crime outcomes discussed here.
23hundred children for Perry Preschool to thirteen hundred for Chicago CPC.
Both Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool signi¯cantly increased high school completion rates overall;
however, the Chicago CPC had more sizeable e®ects on male graduation rates while Perry Preschool
only raised female graduation rates (Reynolds, et al. 2001, Schweinhart, et al. 2005). The IHDP had
no e®ect on high school dropout rates by age 18, while Abecedarian increased college attendance but
not high school completion (McCormick, et al. 2006, Campbell, et al. 2002). These programs typically
produced short-term gains in achievement scores and sometimes generated lasting gains.
The ¯nal column of Table 2 reports estimated e®ects of these programs on late juvenile and adult
crime. As alluded to above, Perry Preschool had signi¯cant e®ects on lifetime crime measured as of age
40 (Schweinhart, et al. 2005). Reductions in the fraction arrested ¯ve or more times were substantial
for both males and females. Both showed reductions of about one-third; however, the size of the
e®ect in absolute terms is much larger for males given their higher baseline crime rate. Reductions in
crime for Perry Preschool students were observed across a broad range of crimes (e.g. drug, property,
and violent crimes) and were apparent even at younger ages. The Chicago CPC also reduced arrest
rates (by age 18) by about one-third (Reynolds, et al. 2001). Another widely cited family support and
preschool program, the Syracuse University Family Development Research Program, showed signi¯cant
reductions in juvenile delinquency measured at a slightly earlier age: 6% of preschool participants had
been placed under probation services by age 15 compared to 22% of controls (Lally, et al. 1988).36
The estimated savings in reduced criminal justice expenditures and victimization costs resulting from
the crime reductions of Perry Preschool and Chicago CPC are sizeable. Using a 3% discount rate,
Bel¯eld, et al. (2006) estimate that the Perry Preschool produced a social bene¯t of over $150,000
(year 2000 dollars) per child from crime reduction alone.37 Reynolds, et al. (2002) estimate that
reductions in juvenile crime through age 18 associated with the Chicago CPC saved society roughly
$8,000. Findings like these, especially those for Perry Preschool, led Donohue and Siegelman (1998)
to conclude that small, rigorous early intervention programs may pay for themselves through reduced
crime rates alone, if they can be targeted to high-crime groups.
Not all early childhood programs in Table 2 yield reductions in crime. While modest reductions in
self-reported convictions and incarceration through age 21 were observed for Abecedarian, none of these
36The Elmira Nurse Home Visitation Program provided home visits by nurses to ¯rst-time mothers who were young,
unmarried, or of low SES. Nurses visited homes for randomly assigned mothers during pregnancy and for the ¯rst two
years of the child's life. Olds, et al. (1998) report mixed but encouraging e®ects of the program on delinquency at age
15: treated youth were more likely to self-report being stopped by the police but had fewer incidences of arrests and
convictions.
37This ¯gure is for bene¯ts through age 40. Using a 7% discount rate produces a social bene¯t from crime of about
$67,000 (Bel¯eld, et al. 2006). Heckman, et al. (2009) report that savings from crime reduction account for about 40-
65% of the bene¯t-cost ratio for Perry Preschool, depending on assumptions about discount rates (0-7%) and the cost of
murder.
24e®ects are statistically signi¯cant (Campbell, et al. 2002). Based on administrative records of adult
criminal charges in North Carolina, Clarke and Campbell (1998) report nearly identical rates of arrests
and criminal charges (as of age 21, on average) for treatment and control children in the Abecedarian
study. Similarly, IHDP produced no signi¯cant e®ects on crime through age 18 (McCormick, et al.
2006).
What is di®erent about Abecedarian and IHDP that these programs did not produce the same
reductions in crime? It is di±cult to point to any particular curriculum di®erence; although, not all
preschools are alike. Abecedarian began preschool at infancy and continued through kindergarten {
the longest of any program. It was also full-day year-round, unlike Perry Preschool or Chicago CPC.
Like Perry Preschool, it showed sizeable gains in achievement and IQ, so it is di±cult to attribute
its lack of e®ects on crime to inadequate intervention. The only obvious program di®erence between
Abecedarian and Perry Preschool or Chicago CPC that might explain the absence of any impact on
crime is its lack of a `home visit' component, but IHDP included home visits by nurses from birth
through three years of age. IHDP began early but also ended when Perry Preschool and Chicago CPC
began (age 3), so it is possible that the early `home visit' combined with later preschool care is a key
combination of services necessary for long-term impacts on delinquency and crime.
An alternative hypothesis is that the environments more than the speci¯cs of the programs were
important in determining impacts on crime. Chapel Hill is a mid-sized mostly white and relatively
a²uent university city in the South, while Ypsilanti is a smaller industrial city with a sizeable minority
population. Chicago CPC sites were in low-income neighborhoods in a large urban midwestern city.
(IHDP had sites throughout the U.S.) It seems quite possible that the same program might have
di®erent e®ects in each city. As noted by Barnett and Masse (2007), crime rates were 70% higher in
Ypsilanti than Chapel Hill when the respective program participants would have been age 15. They
speculate that there may have been little crime to prevent among the Abecedarian sample; however,
Clarke and Cambpell (1998) report that the two control samples (Perry and Abecedarian) had very
similar arrest rates (around 40%) by their early 20s. McCormick, et al. (2006) report that juvenile
arrest rates among controls were similar for the IHDP and Chicago CPC as well. So, among the
target populations for these programs, crime rates were fairly similar even if local crime rates were
quite di®erent. Of course, it is possible that the long-term e®ects of early childhood programs depend
as much on the environment in which participants grow up as on individual and family characteristics
of the participants themselves. If so, it is important to exercise caution in extrapolating bene¯ts from
any single program or community to the wider population.
Despite the fact that children targeted by all programs were disadvantaged, there is a sizeable
di®erence in baseline educational attainment levels between Abecedarian and IHDP on the one hand
25and Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool on the other. High school graduation rates were 70% among
Abecedarian controls; dropout rates (as of age 18) were only 10% among the IHDP controls. These
both compare quite favorably with Chicago CPC and Perry Preschool controls who had high school
completion rates ranging from 30-50%. Neither IHDP nor Abecedarian increased high school grad-
uation rates. While Abecedarian improved college attendance rates, this does not appear to be an
important margin for crime (see Figure 1). Given the tight link between high school dropout and
crime discussed earlier, it may not be particularly surprising that Abecedarian and IHDP did not re-
duce crime given their negligible e®ects on high school completion. Yet, Perry Preschool substantially
reduced male crime rates without raising educational attainment among males. Clearly, early inter-
ventions may reduce delinquency and criminal behavior without signi¯cantly improving ¯nal schooling
outcomes.
In the end, there is no easy explanation for the di®erent ¯ndings across studies. While the results
from these studies are individually powerful given their research designs (most are based on random
assignment), it is di±cult to draw strong conclusions overall about the e±cacy of early childhood
interventions as a national crime-¯ghting strategy. The fact that sample sizes are quite modest and
that program populations are not necessarily representative of the U.S. raises additional questions.
This itself may explain some of the variation in ¯ndings across studies. It is natural to ask how
these programs would a®ect other populations. Questions about scalability have also been raised: can
these programs and their e®ects be reproduced at a larger scale? These issues have led a number of
researchers to analyze the largest early childhood program in the U.S.: Head Start. This program
targets children from low-income families usually living in low-income communities and has served
hundreds of thousands of children throughout the U.S. since its inception in 1967.
Because no large-scale long-term random assignment studies of Head Start are available, researchers
have employed non-experimental methods. These studies generally examine impacts on national sam-
ples of individuals served by Head Start, using data from the Panel Survey of Income and Dynamics
(PSID) or Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (CNLSY). We next discuss those
studies that examine the impacts of Head Start on behavioral problems, delinquency, or measures of
adult crime.
Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) and Deming (2009b) use a family ¯xed e®ects approach to
estimate the e®ects of Head Start on a variety of long-term outcomes. By comparing siblings who did
and did not attend a Head Start program at ages 3-5, they address important concerns about perma-
nent or long-run di®erences across families that may a®ect decisions about preschool or Head Start
enrollment.38 Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) use data from the PSID, examining adult outcomes
38Of course, they leave unanswered the question as to why some siblings enroll in Head Start while others from the
26for individuals born between 1964 and 1977, while Deming (2009b) uses data from the CNLSY and
examines outcomes for individuals born in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Despite using the same
empirical approach, the two studies ¯nd quite di®erent patterns for Head Start impacts on educational
attainment and criminal behavior. Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) estimate signi¯cant increases
in high school completion (by 20 percentage points) and college attendance (by 28 percentage points)
for whites only, while Deming (2009b) estimates an 11 percentage point increase in high school com-
pletion rates and a 14 percentage point increase in college attendance for blacks only. Excluding GED
recipients, Deming (2009b) estimates a smaller (7 percentage points) and statistically insigni¯cant ef-
fect on high school completion for blacks, suggesting that much of their apparent improvement in high
school completion is due to increases in the GED.39 Regarding crime, estimates by Garces, Thomas,
and Currie (2002) suggest that Head Start reduces the probability of being booked or charged with a
crime by about 12 percentage points among blacks, with no e®ect on whites. Deming (2009b) ¯nds
no signi¯cant e®ects of Head Start on crime for blacks or whites.40
Carneiro and Ginja (2008) use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the e®ects of Head
Start on adolescent outcomes, including the probability that someone is sentenced for a crime. Their
approach exploits the fact that Head Start imposes strict eligibility criteria related to family income
and structure: children ages 3-5 are eligible if family income is below the federal poverty guidelines
or if the family is eligible for public assistance. Since these criteria vary across states and time, the
income thresholds vary across these dimensions as well. They exploit this exogenous variation in
eligibility, assuming the e®ects of family income (when children are ages 3-5) on subsequent outcomes
are continuous. Using data from the CNLSY on youth who would have enrolled in Head Start during
the 1980s and 1990s, they estimate that participation in Head Start at ages 3-5 signi¯cantly reduces
the probability (by 31 percentage points) a 16-17 year-old male is sentenced for a crime (based on
self-reports). They estimate similar e®ects for a sample of blacks only. These estimates measure the
e®ect of Head Start on children who were at the margin of eligibility for the program and, therefore,
represent the e®ects we might expect with modest expansions of the program.
Altogether, the non-experimental evidence on Head Start appears to suggest some long-term e®ects
on education and crime, but ¯ndings vary in important ways across studies.41 The strongest e®ects
same family do not and, more importantly, whether di®erent enrollment decisions are related to underlying di®erences
in child abilities or other factors that may a®ect outcomes later in life.
39The substitution between high school degrees and GED receipt is less relevant for the earlier cohort studied by
Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002), since the GED was much less common in the 1980s relative to more recent years.
40His measure of crime is an indicator equal to one if the respondent reports having been convicted of a crime, been
on probation, sentenced by a judge, or is in prison at the time of the interview.
41While Head Start may a®ect juvenile and adult crime even if it has no e®ect on educational attainment (as with
males in the Perry Preschool program), one might speculate that any increases in schooling (especially high school years)
associated with Head Start should lead to reductions in crime as estimated by Lochner and Moretti (2004). Under this
assumption, estimates from Ludwig and Miller (2007), which suggest that roughly doubling Head Start spending (per
27on crime appear to exist for blacks; although, Deming (2009) ¯nds no e®ect on crime for either blacks
or whites. Combined with the evidence from smaller scale programs evaluated by randomized trials,
there is limited but important evidence that early childhood interventions can reduce crime later in
life for youth from disadvantaged backgrounds.
A recent program, Fast Track, introduced in four sites around the U.S., provides group- and
individual-based services to children from grades one through ten. The program speci¯cally targets
children from high crime and poverty neighborhoods who exhibit conduct problems in kindergarten,
with the primary aim of preventing antisocial behavior and psychiatric disorders. The program fo-
cuses on three elements of development: social and cognitive skills, peer relationships, and parenting.
During early grades, parents were o®ered training and home visits to help improve parenting skills,
while children were engaged in group activities to foster friendships and tutoring sessions in reading.
As children aged, more individualized services were provided, along with group sessions aimed at
dealing with the transition to middle school, resistance to drugs, etc. The program also incorporated
a classroom intervention during grades 1-5 at schools with program children. Teachers implemented
2-3 sessions per week designed to promote social and emotional competence and to reduce aggression.
Experimental estimates based on random assignment suggest that the program produced sustained
improvements in conduct disorders and anti-social behavior over grades 3-9 (Conduct Problems Pre-
vention Research Group, CPPRG, 2007). As of grade 9, high risk youth (those from the top 3% of
conduct problems in kindergarten) receiving the Fast Track program showed signi¯cant reductions in
self-reported delinquency and criminal behavior; however, no signi¯cant e®ects on anti-social behavior
were found for other youth.42 Two recent follow-up studies (CPPRG 2010a, 2010b) suggest that the
reductions in crime and conduct problems extend at least two years beyond the conclusion of the
program (last measured at grade 12/age 19) and continue to be focused on youth that were initially
`high risk'. E®ects on juvenile conduct disorders did not appear to decline after the program, while
e®ects on crime showed some fade-out.
Experimental evaluations of two earlier, more limited elementary school-age interventions are worth
commenting on, since they also focused largely on social development among `high-risk' children. The
Montreal Longitudinal Experimental Study provided social skills training to ¯rst and second grade
capita) increases high school completion rates by as much as four percentage points, imply that this policy should also
reduce arrest rates by up to 3-4%. Of course, multiplying the Garces, Thomas, and Currie (2002) estimated e®ects of
Head Start on schooling attainment among whites by Lochner and Moretti's (2004) estimated e®ects of education on
crime suggests that Head Start attendance should signi¯cantly reduce incarceration rates among whites, while analogous
estimates from Deming (2009b) suggest that Head Start should reduce crime among blacks. Yet, these studies estimated
no e®ect of Head Start attendance on self-reported measures of arrest, conviction, or incarceration rates for these
populations.
42Results for anti-social behavior are based on an index created from self-reports of serious delinquent/criminal actions
like stealing something worth more than $100, assault, selling heroin or LSD, and sexual assault.
28children, along with teacher and parent training over those same years. Boisjoli, et al. (2007) report
that by age 24, children receiving the intervention (compared to control children) were twice as likely
to have completed high school and only half as likely to have a criminal record. The Seattle Social
Development Project intervened over a longer period (grades 1-6); however, it only provided teacher
and parent training (aimed at improving child social and emotional skill development). As of age 21,
Hawkins, et al. (2005) estimate that the six-year intervention had increased high school graduation
rates from 81 to 91 percent and signi¯cantly reduced self-reported crime and o±cial lifetime court
charges (from 53 to 42 percent).
Altogether, the evidence from Fast Track, the Montreal Longitudinal Experimental Study, and
the Seattle Social Development Project suggests that comprehensive school-age programs designed to
improve social development can produce lasting impacts on educational attainment, conduct disorders,
and criminal behavior. In many ways, these programs emphasized social over cognitive development
relative to the preschool programs summarized in Table 2. Of course, both sets of programs were
broad-based and yielded improvements in both domains.43
Programs targeted to older adolescents and young adults have shown mixed results. The Quantum
Opportunity Program provided entering high school students with a mentor/tutor that aided them in
schoolwork and community activities for four years. Financial incentives designed to encourage high
school graduation and college enrollment were provided for educational, service, and developmental
activities. A recent random assignment evaluation of the program reported no signi¯cant improvements
in schooling or reductions in crime six years after scheduled high school graduation (Schirm, Stuart,
and McKie 2006). In part, this may be due to the relatively low participation by youth in program
activities.44
The Job Corps provides intensive basic educational and vocational training for economically dis-
advantaged youth and young adults ages 16-24 throughout the U.S. The program also o®ers a wide
range of other services (e.g. counseling, social skills training, health education, job placement services).
The average participant is enrolled for about 8 months, with most living in residence at training sites.
The program's primary goal is to improve employment and earnings prospects. Based on a recent
random assignment evaluation, Schochet, Burghardt and Glazerman (2001) conclude that the pro-
gram produced modest positive impacts on post-program employment and earnings. The program
also reduced self-reported arrest rates by about 30% during the ¯rst year after random assignment,
when most youth would have been enrolled. Reductions in subsequent years were smaller and statis-
43This is largely consistent with recent estimates of skill production functions for both cognitive and `non-cognitive'
skills (e.g., see Cunha and Heckman 2008).
44On average, youth spent only 177 hours per year on educational, community, and developmental activities. Roughly
one-in-four spent no time at all in these activities by the fourth year of the program.
29tically insigni¯cant. The program also signi¯cantly reduced conviction rates by about 17% during the
four years following random assignment.45 Conclusions from the less-expensive and non-residential
JOBSTART program are largely consistent with these ¯ndings (Cave, et al. 1993).46
Collectively, these studies indicate that human capital-based interventions from early childhood to
early adulthood can reduce juvenile and adult crime, at least for some populations. To understand
why, it is useful to brie°y return to the model laid out in Section 2 to aid in interpreting these ¯ndings.
The model suggests that e®ective interventions may reduce juvenile and adult crime by improving child
learning productivity, A, increasing adolescent human capital levels, H1, or by socializing children (i.e.
lowering µ). While preschool programs highlighted in Table 2 may raise learning abilities, achievement
gains are generally short-lived and limited to primary school ages. Evidence of reduced criminal activity
among adolescents attributed to early intervention programs, suggests that these programs raise initial
market skills (H1) and/or reduce criminal returns (µ) through socialization. School-based programs
for high-risk youth like Fast Track emphasized social development (i.e. lowering µ) over cognitive
achievement; yet, they also likely improved adolescent human capital levels H1. Despite the di®erence
in emphasis between the two types of programs, both have shown the ability to signi¯cantly reduce
juvenile and adult crime. Job training programs for adolescents and young adults directly operate
on the incentives to invest in human capital (analogous to an increase in the subsidy rate s in our
model) and have led to modest reductions in crime during periods of heavy training. These programs
have produced only modest increases in earnings and negligible long-run e®ects on crime, however,
suggesting that simply training low-skilled adolescents does not provide the same promise as earlier
interventions that act on individual endowments.
5 Policy Lessons
In this section, we discuss a number of important policy lessons regarding human capital policies and
crime. First, we summarize evidence on the social savings from crime reduction that we might expect
from policies that increase educational attainment or enrollment, improve school choice and quality,
45An earlier study by Long, et al. (1981) estimated that the social bene¯ts from reduced criminal activity among Job
Corps participants amounted to over $7,000 (in 2008 dollars) per participant { almost 30% of the total social bene¯t of
the program.
46JOBSTART o®ered many of the same basic components of the Job Corps to a similar population. Cave, et al. (1993)
¯nd modest (and statistically insigni¯cant) positive e®ects on earnings 3-4 years after random assignment for the full
sample; however, earnings increased roughly 25% (in years 3 and 4) for male participants with a prior arrest (i.e. had
an arrest since age 16 but prior to random assignment). Among male participants with no prior arrest, the program
signi¯cantly reduced self-reports of an arrest (6.4 percentage points or 36%) during the ¯rst year after random assignment
(i.e. the training year) but did not reduce the fraction arrested in subsequent years. Among males with a prior arrest,
the program (insigni¯cantly) reduced the fraction reporting an arrest over the ¯rst four years after random assignment
by about 8% and had negligible e®ects on arrests during the ¯rst year. There were no signi¯cant e®ects on arrests for
female participants.
30or expand access to early childhood interventions. Second, we highlight a few sub-populations and
schooling margins that are likely to yield the greatest social gain from crime reduction. Finally, we
discuss a few other lessons based on the evidence.
5.1 Valuing the Social Bene¯ts from Crime Reduction
Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate that increasing educational attainment levels in the population
yields sizeable social bene¯ts. Speci¯cally, they calculate the social savings from crime reduction that
would result from a one percentage point increase in high school graduation rates in the U.S. Table 3
summarizes their exercise, translating all dollar values into 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Column 1 reports total costs per crime associated with
murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny/theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.47 Column 2
reports the predicted change in total U.S. arrests based on the Lochner and Moretti (2004) o®ense-
speci¯c arrest estimates discussed earlier and the total number of arrests in the 1990 Uniform Crime
Reports. Column 3 adjusts the arrest e®ect in column 2 by the number of crimes per arrest. In total,
nearly 100,000 fewer crimes would have taken place in 1990 if high school graduation rates had been
one percentage point higher. The implied social savings from reduced crime are shown in column
4. Savings from murder alone are as high as $1.7 billion. Savings from reduced assaults amount to
nearly $550 million. Because the estimates suggest that schooling increases rape and robbery o®enses,
increased costs associated with these crimes partially o®set the bene¯ts from reductions in other
crimes.
The ¯nal row reports the total savings from reductions in all eight types of crime. Because these
¯gures only include a partial list of crimes (e.g. nearly 25% of all prisoners in 1991 were incarcerated for
drug o®enses according to the U.S. Dept. of Justice (1994)) and do not include all costs associated with
each crime (e.g. private security measures are omitted), these amounts are likely to under-estimate
the true social bene¯t associated with increasing high school graduation rates. Still, the savings are
substantial: the social bene¯ts of a one percentage point increase in male U.S. high school graduation
rates (from reduced crime alone) in 1990 would have amounted to more than $2 billion. This represents
more than $3,000 in annual savings per additional male graduate.
Open school enrollment lotteries and desegregation e®orts also appear to reduce crime rates by
improving school quality. Deming (2009a) estimates that reductions in arrests associated with o®ering
better quality school options to a high-risk youth produces a roughly $16,000 social savings to victims
over the next seven years. Because better schools are also likely to have reduced crimes that never led
to an arrest, total victimization savings are likely to be even greater. Total social savings should be
47These costs include incarceration and victim costs. See notes to Table 3 or Lochner and Moretti (2004) for details.
31still larger once savings on prisons and other crime prevention costs are factored in.
The e®ects of school attendance on contemporaneous juvenile crime rates are more complicated.
Studies estimating the e®ects of day-to-day changes in attendance suggest that in urban communities
additional school days reduce property crime while increasing violent crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003,
Luallen 2006). Overall, the social costs associated with increased violence are likely to dominate
the bene¯ts from reduced property crime. On the other hand, Anderson (2009) estimates reductions
in both violent and property juvenile crime associated with increases in compulsory schooling ages.
Thus, his ¯ndings suggest an overall social savings from juvenile crime reduction, although he does
not attempt to put a dollar value on the e®ects.
Evidence on the e®ects of early childhood and school-age interventions are mixed. Long-run im-
pacts on juvenile delinquency and adult crime can be substantial for disadvantaged youth. For exam-
ple, estimates suggest that Perry Preschool produced a social bene¯t from crime reduction of roughly
$150,000 per child (through age 40). On the other hand, Abecedarian produced no signi¯cant impacts
on crime. In choosing between programs or policies, it is, of course, important to incorporate the
wide-ranging bene¯ts of early childhood programs (e.g. higher earnings, better health, etc.). Even if
early interventions are not more cost-e®ective in reducing crime when compared against more tradi-
tional law enforcement or justice system policies, they may provide greater total social value once all
bene¯ts are considered.
5.2 Where are the Big Returns?
Given the most sizeable reductions in crime appear to result from the ¯nal years of high school, policies
that encourage high school completion would seem to be most promising in terms of their impacts
on crime.48 Because crime rates are already quite low among high school graduates, policies that
encourage college attendance or completion are likely to yield much smaller social bene¯ts from crime
reduction; although, they may be desirable on other grounds.49
In general, policies designed to encourage schooling among more crime-prone groups are likely to
produce the greatest bene¯ts from crime reduction. Consistent with this, the school-age Fast Track
program appears to have reduced juvenile crime only among very high-risk children, showing little
impact on even moderately high-risk children (CPPRG 2007, 2010b). Similarly, Deming (2009a) esti-
mates that improved school choice for middle and high school students leads to signi¯cant reductions
in arrests for high-risk youth but not for others. As Donohue and Siegelman (1998) conclude, the over-
48See Hanushek and Lindseth (2009), Jacob and Ludwig (2008), or Murnane (2008) for recent discussions of policies
to improve schooling outcomes in the U.S.
49The fact that crime declines substantially with high school completion but not college attendance suggests that net
expected returns from crime for most individuals lie somewhere between the wages of high school dropouts and graduates.
See Freeman (1999) for a summary of evidence regarding criminal wages and earnings.
32all e±ciency of early childhood programs as a crime-¯ghting strategy is likely to depend heavily on
the ability to target high-risk children at very young ages. The same is likely to be true for school-age
interventions.
Social bene¯ts from crime reduction also vary across gender and race. Men commit much less
crime than women, on average. Thus, it is not surprising that crime-related bene¯ts from education
policies and interventions are typically much smaller for females than males (e.g. Perry Preschool,
Job Corps). This is true even though programs sometimes reduce female and male crime rates by
similar amounts in percentage terms. While there are no studies to date comparing the impacts of
educational attainment on female vs. male crime rates, there would have to be a substantially larger
proportional e®ect on female crime rates to produce overall crime reductions to rival those estimated for
men. Among men, Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate much larger e®ects of additional schooling on
incarceration rates among blacks relative to whites. Garces, Currie and Thomas (2002) estimate that
Head Start signi¯cantly reduces crime for blacks but not whites; however, Deming (2009b) estimates
no e®ect on crime for either group while Carneiro and Ginja (2008) estimate similar large e®ects on
both. Because crime rates are much higher among blacks than whites, on average, policies would
generally need to produce much larger proportional reductions in white crime rates to achieve similar
absolute reductions in crime. None of the evidence surveyed here suggests that this is the case.
5.3 Additional Policy Lessons
A few other useful lessons can be drawn from the studies surveyed here.
First, education policies reduce property crime as well as violent crime. In fact, the estimated
e®ects of educational attainment or school enrollment on property and violent o®enses are often quite
similar in percentage terms (Lochner and Moretti 2004, Anderson 2009). Even murder appears to be
quite responsive to changes in educational attainment and school quality (Lochner and Moretti 2004,
Weiner, Lutz, and Ludwig 2009).
Second, higher wages increase the opportunity costs (including work foregone while incarcerated)
of both property and violent crime. Lochner and Moretti (2004) show that the estimated e®ects of
educational attainment on crime can largely be accounted for by the e®ects of schooling on wages
and the e®ects of wages on crime. This is important, since it suggests that policymakers can reduce
crime simply by increasing labor market skills; they need not alter individual preferences or otherwise
socialize youth. Of course, as evidence from the Job Corps and other training programs suggests, this
is not necessarily an easy task. Training programs targeted at low-skill adolescents and young adults
have modest (at best) e®ects on earnings and crime. On the other hand, encouraging youth to ¯nish
high school (e.g. through compulsory schooling laws) appears to substantially increase earnings and
33reduce crime. Preventing early school dropout is likely to be more successful than trying to compensate
for dropout a few years later.
Third, education-based policies need not increase educational attainment to reduce crime. Studies
on school choice lotteries (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006, Deming 2009a) suggest that providing
disadvantaged urban youth with better schools can substantially reduce juvenile and adult crime,
even if it has small e®ects on educational outcomes. Perry Preschool had no e®ect on male schooling
levels but substantially reduced male crime rates through age 40 (Schweinhart, et al. 2005).
Fourth, evidence that violent crime is higher on school days than non-school days in urban districts
suggests that social interaction e®ects are particularly important for juvenile violent crime (Jacob and
Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006). Smart policing e®orts may be able to help address some of the problems
associated with schools releasing lots of adolescents at the same time. For example, an increased police
presence immediately after school or other major adolescent congregations let out may be warranted.
Or, on non-school days, it may be wise for police to focus more on targets or areas of juvenile property
crime, worrying less about violent crime. The `hot spot' or `problem-oriented policing' literature in
criminology suggests that informed targeting of police e®orts to high crime areas (and, by extension,
times) can be e®ective at reducing overall crime rates.50 Alternatively, it may be useful to consider
ways of designing after-school youth programs or other weekend activities to minimize violent behavior
afterwards.
6 Conclusions
There is growing evidence that improvements in school quality and increases in educational attainment,
especially high school completion, reduce adult violent and property crime rates. Policies that induce
students to spend an extra year or more attending school also appear to reduce juvenile crime. These
¯ndings are broadly consistent with a human capital-based model of crime and work. For most types
of crime, additional schooling is likely to raise legitimate wage rates much more than the returns
to crime, thereby discouraging the latter. Lochner and Moretti (2004) argue that the reductions in
violent and property crime associated with increased schooling is roughly equivalent to the e®ect of
education on wages multiplied by the e®ect of increased wages on crime. Thus, most of the e®ect
of education on violent and property crime may come from increased wages. By contrast, education
may increase the returns to white collar crime more than the returns to work. Consistent with this,
Lochner (2004) ¯nds that arrest rates for white collar crime increase when education levels rise.
Education-based programs may also socialize youth, reducing personal or psychic rewards from
crime. Emphasizing social and emotional development, school-age programs like Fast Track have shown
50For a recent survey of this literature, see Braga (2005).
34the ability to signi¯cantly reduce later conduct disorders and crime (among high-risk children). These
programs also improved educational outcomes, which may explain some of their impacts on crime.
Perry Preschool reduced male (and female) crime rates without a®ecting male schooling outcomes.
Thus, the program appears to have improved social development or increased early skill levels (without
noticeably a®ecting subsequent schooling investments). Evidence from school choice lotteries suggests
that improvements in school and peer quality can lead to reductions in crime without raising student
achievement or educational attainment. The most likely explanation for the reduction in crime is that
higher quality schools better socialize youth or provide them with a better set of peers. Yet, evidence
from the MTO experiment suggests that moving families to lower poverty neighborhoods does not
produce the same reductions in crime, complicating any explanation related to peer e®ects or social
networks.
Education may also increase patience or alter preferences for risk; however, neither seems to be
central to the estimated impacts on crime. Property crimes are generally associated with less than
one month of expected time in jail or prison conditional on being sentenced (see Table 1), hardly
enough time for modest changes in patience to play much of a role. Property crimes also have very
low expected probabilities of arrest (typically less than 10% chance) and even lower probabilities of
incarceration (typically less than 1%), so there is little actual uncertainty in outcomes associated with
these crimes (see Table 1). Yet, estimated impacts of schooling on property crime are similar to those
for violent crime, which entails much longer and more uncertain prison sentences.
Altogether, the evidence suggests that while e®orts to socialize youth can be e®ective, simply
providing them with valuable market skills can discourage them from choosing a life of crime. In
terms of crime reduction, human capital-based policies that target the most disadvantaged (and crime-
prone) are likely to be the most e±cient, while also promoting a more equitable society. To that end,
increasing high school graduation rates and improving our nation's worst inner city schools are likely
to yield the greatest social return.
Although policies that increase school attendance for a year or more (e.g. increased compulsory
schooling ages) appear to reduce both violent and property crime (Anderson 2009), a few extra days
o® from school may actually lead to reductions in violent crime, especially in urban areas (Jacob and
Lefgren 2003, Luallen 2006). From a human capital perspective, the increased opportunities that open
up for youth attending an additional year of schooling should raise the future costs of incarceration
associated with juvenile crime. This may serve as an important additional criminal deterrent that
does not exist for day-to-day changes in the school calendar. In general, the e®ects of longer periods of
attendance on contemporaneous juvenile crime are consistent with the subsequent e®ects of additional
schooling on adult crime. The evidence on day-to-day changes in the school calendar highlights the
35possibility that by bringing many adolescents together, schools may foster negative interactions that
lead to violence after school is out. Schools may also bring youth together who then look for trouble
once they leave school grounds. Policies that ¯nd ways to address these problems may be e®ective at
reducing juvenile violence after school. For example, after-school programs may help keep youth busy
long enough to prevent some after-school violence, or they may simply delay the problems. Police
might be deployed di®erently on school days and non-school days, focusing on violent juvenile activity
on school days and juvenile property crime on non-school days.
There are many ways by which early childhood interventions may a®ect juvenile and adult crime.
The human capital approach favored in this chapter highlights the potential e®ects of these programs
on learning abilities, adolescent skill levels, and socialization or tastes for crime. These programs
may also a®ect childhood preferences, including risk aversion, patience, or self-control. While a few
early childhood programs have produced sizeable reductions in both juvenile and adult crime { most
famously, Perry Preschool { other quite similar programs have not. School-age interventions focused
on developing social and emotional skills have proven successful at reducing later conduct disorders
and crime, especially among very high-risk children. The bene¯ts from reduced crime associated with
successful programs certainly warrant the attention they have received; yet, we still need to know
much more about why other programs have not produced the same e®ects. Is it the curriculum, the
population served, or the later school and post-school environment faced by program participants?
Two things are clear. First, preschool and school-age programs have substantially reduced crime for
some disadvantaged high-risk populations. Even if these gains cannot be expected in all cases, they
are large enough to warrant careful consideration on a broader scale. Second, successful programs did
not always increase educational attainment, even when they signi¯cantly reduced juvenile and adult
crime rates. Thus, disappointing achievement or educational outcomes need not imply the absence of
bene¯ts from crime reduction.
Given current evidence, it is di±cult to draw strong conclusions about the relative bene¯ts of trying
to target and `treat' children at very young ages vs. intervening at later ages to keep adolescents from
dropping out of high school. Of course, we need not choose one or the other. Indeed, both are likely to
be important components of a broad-based national crime-¯ghting agenda. Calculations by Lochner
and Moretti (2004) and Donohue and Seigelman (1998) suggest that both human capital-oriented
policies are competitive with more traditional law enforcement and incarceration e®orts when all
bene¯ts are considered.
36Appendix: Comparative Statics Results
In this appendix, we derive comparative static results for the model discussed in the paper. We
¯rst derive results for the `fully interior' case where optimal investment and crime decisions satisfy
0 < I;c1;I + c1;c2 < 1. Then, we derive results for the case when adolescents choose not to work, so
optimal investment and crime satis¯es I + c1 = 1 and 0 < I;c1;c2 < 1.
Following the text, assume that N(¢) and h(¢) are twice continuously di®erentiable in all arguments
and that Nc > 0, Ncc < 0, Ncµ > 0, NH ¸ 0, NHH · 0, NcH ¸ 0, hI > 0, hII < 0, hIH > 0, hIA > 0,
hH > 0, and hA ¸ 0.
Case 1: Working Adolescents
De¯ne the individual objective function to be maximized with respect to I, c1, c2:
F(I;c1;c2;A;H1;µ;s) ´ fH1(1 ¡ I ¡ c1) + sI1 + N(c1;H1;µ)g + R¡1 fH2(1 ¡ c2) + N(c2;H2;µ)g:
At an interior optimum (i.e. optimal investment and crime satisfy 0 < I;c1;I + c1;c2 < 1):
FI = ¡H1 + s + R¡1 [(1 ¡ c2) + NH(c2;H2;µ)]hI(I;H1;A) = 0
Fc1 = ¡H1 + Nc(c1;H1;µ) = 0
Fc2 = R¡1[¡H2 + Nc(c2;H2;µ)] = 0:
Assuming s < H1 combined with FI = 0 implies that 1 ¡ c2 + NH2 > 0 at an optimum. Given
NH ¸ 0, this is necessary for optimal c2 2 (0;1) as required for an interior solution. We use the fact
that 1 ¡ c2 + NH2 > 0 at an interior optimum repeatedly throughout this appendix without further
reference.
Second order conditions for a maximum require a negative de¯nite hessian matrix of second deriva-







A, where FIc1 = Fc1c2 = 0 and
FII = R¡1 £




Fc1c1 = Nc1c1 < 0
Fc2c2 = R¡1Nc2c2 < 0
FIc2 = R¡1hI (NH2c2 ¡ 1):
Condition 1 implies that FIc2 · 0; otherwise, FIc2 > 0 when Condition 1 does not hold.
37Result 1: E®ects of s
Using Cramer's rule, observe that @I
@s =
¡Fc1c1Fc2c2
jHj > 0, since FIs = 1, Fc1s = Fc2s = 0, and jHj < 0
at an optimum (SOC for a maximum). We obtain @c1
@s = 0 and @c2
@s =
Fc1c1FIc2
jHj . If Condition 1 holds,
then @c2
@s · 0; otherwise, @c2
@s > 0.
Result 2: E®ects of A
Notice Fc1A = 0,
FIA = R¡1hIA (1 ¡ c2 + NH2) + R¡1hIhANH2H2
Fc2A = R¡1hA (Nc2H2 ¡ 1):
The ¯rst term in FIA is greater than zero at an optimum; however, the second term is generally
negative. Yet, for hI < 1 and hA < 1, there exists some small " > 0 for which FIA > 0 if NHH > ¡"
by continuity. Fc2A · 0 if condition 1 holds; otherwise, it is strictly greater than zero.
Applying Cramer's rule, we obtain @I
@A =
¡Fc1c1(FIAFc2c2¡Fc2AFIc2)
jHj . Thus, @I
@A > 0 if NHH > ¡". We
also obtain @c1
@s = 0 and @c2
@A =
¡Fc1c1(FIIFc2A¡FIc2FIA)
jHj . If Condition 1 holds, then @c2
@A · 0; otherwise,
@c2
@A > 0.
Result 3: E®ects of H1
Notice
FIH1 = ¡1 + R¡1 [hIH1 (1 ¡ c2 + NH2) + hINH2H2 (1 + hH1)]
Fc1H1 = NH1c1 ¡ 1
Fc2H1 = R¡1(1 + hH1)(Nc2H2 ¡ 1):
While Fc1H1 · 0 and Fc2H1 · 0 if Condition 1 holds (otherwise, both are positive), it is not possible
to generally sign FIH1. As such, it is not possible to sign @I
@H1 and @c2





jHj . Since FIIFc2c2 ¡F2
Ic2 > 0 at a maximum, @c1
@H1 · 0 if Condition
1 holds; otherwise, @c1
@H1 > 0.
Result 4: E®ects of µ
Notice
FIµ = R¡1hINµH2
Fc1µ = Nc1µ > 0
Fc2µ = R¡1Nc2µ > 0:




jHj > 0, since FIIFc2c2 ¡ F2







jHj . If Condition 1 holds and
NHµ · 0, then @I
@µ · 0 and @c2
@µ > 0. If Condition 1 does not hold and NHµ > 0, then @I
@µ > 0 and
@c2
@µ > 0.
Case 2: Non-Working Adolescents
We now consider the problem when optimal investment and ¯rst period crime satisfy I + c1 = 1.
Imposing c1 = 1 ¡ I, the individual objective function to be maximized with respect to I and c2 is:
G(I;c2;A;H1;µ;s) ´ fsI + N(1 ¡ I;H1;µ)g + R¡1 fH2(1 ¡ c2) + N(c2;H2;µ)g:
At an interior optimum (i.e. optimal investment and crime satisfy 0 < I;c2 < 1):
GI = s ¡ Nc(1 ¡ I;H1;µ) + R¡1 [(1 ¡ c2) + NH(c2;H2;µ)]hI(I;H1;A) = 0
Gc2 = R¡1[¡H2 + Nc(c2;H2;µ)] = 0:
For optimal c2 2 (0;1), it must be the case that 1¡c2+NH2 > 0. This implies that s < Nc(1¡I;H1;µ)
at an optimum, since GI = 0. We use the fact that 1 ¡ c2 + NH2 > 0 (at an optimum) repeatedly
below.






j ~ Hj > 0, where
GII = Nc1c1 + R¡1 £




Gc2c2 = R¡1Nc2c2 < 0
GIc2 = R¡1hI (NH2c2 ¡ 1):
Condition 1 implies that GIc2 · 0; otherwise, GIc2 > 0.




Result 1: E®ects of s
Clearly, GIs = 1 and Gc2s = 0, so Cramer's rule implies that @I
@s =
¡Gc2c2
j ~ Hj > 0 and @c2
@s =
GIc2
j ~ Hj . If
Condition 1 holds, then @c2
@s · 0; otherwise, @c2
@s > 0.
Result 2: E®ects of A
Notice
GIA = R¡1hIA (1 ¡ c2 + NH2) + R¡1hIhANH2H2
Gc2A = R¡1hA (Nc2H2 ¡ 1):
39As was the case above, for hI < 1 and hA < 1, there exists some small " > 0 for which GIA > 0 if
NHH > ¡" by continuity. Gc2A · 0 if condition 1 holds; otherwise, Gc2A > 0.
Applying Cramer's rule, we obtain @I
@A =
¡(GIAGc2c2¡Gc2AGIc2)
j ~ Hj . Thus, @I




j ~ Hj . If Condition 1 holds, then @c2
@A · 0; otherwise, @c2
@A > 0.
Result 3: E®ects of H1
Notice
GIH1 = ¡Nc1H1 + R¡1 [hIH1 (1 ¡ c2 + NH2) + hINH2H2 (1 + hH1)]
Gc2H1 = R¡1(1 + hH1)(Nc2H2 ¡ 1):
While Gc2H1 · 0 if Condition 1 holds (otherwise, it is positive), it is not possible to generally sign
GIH1. If NH = 0, then GIc2 < 0, GIH1 > 0, and Gc2H1 < 0. In this case, applying Cramer's rule
yields @I
@H1 > 0 and @c2
@H2 < 0.
Result 4: E®ects of µ
Notice
GIµ = ¡Nc1µ + R¡1hINµH2
Gc2µ = R¡1Nc2µ > 0:
Clearly, GIµ < 0 if NHµ · 0; otherwise, it cannot generally be signed. If Condition 1 holds and
NHµ · 0, then applying Cramer's rule yields @I
@µ · 0 and @c2
@µ > 0.
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46Figure 1: Regression-Adjusted Probability of Incarceration by Education (Men Ages 20-60)
(a) Whites














































































Notes: From 1960, 1970, and 1980 U.S. Censuses. Regressions control for age, state of birth, state of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 2: Effects of Selected Early Childhood Programs on Educational Attainment and Adult Crime




school from infancy 
to kindergarten
developmentally at-risk 
children, Chapel Hill, 
NC
Random Assign.
increased high school 
graduation rate by 0.03 
(0.70 vs. 0.67) and 
enrollment in 4-yr 
college by 0.22
* (0.36 vs. 
0.14)









increased high school 
completion rate by 0.09 
(0.57 vs. 0.48) for 
females and 0.14
* (0.43 
vs. 0.29) for males
by age 18, reduced 






(school year) ages 3 
and 4, bi-weekly 
home visits
low-income black 




increased high school 
graduation rates by 0.52
* 
(0.84 vs. 0.32) for 
females and reduced 
grad. rates by 0.04 (0.50 
vs. 0.54) for males
by age 40, reduced 
fraction arrested 5 or more 
times by 0.10
*  (0.24 vs. 
0.34) for females and 
0.24
* (0.45 vs. 0.69) for 
males




home visits from 0-36 
months, full-time full-
year pre-school 12-36 
months
low birth-weight pre-
term infants, 8 sites
Random Assign.
no sig. effect on high 
school dropout (approx. 
10% dropout rate)
no sig. effects on arrests 
by age 18
Notes: Effects for Abecedarian  Project taken from Campbell, et al. (2002) and Clarke and Campbell (1998).  Effects for Chicago Child Parent Center taken from Reynolds, 
et al. (2001).  Effects for Perry Preschool taken from Schweinhart, et al. (2005).  Effects for IHDP taken from McCormick, et al. (2006).  
*denotes difference is statistically 
significant at 0.05 level.Table 3: Social Bene¯ts of Increasing High School Completion Rates by 1 Percent
Total Cost Est. Change Est. Change Social
per crime in Arrests in Crimes Bene¯t
Violent Crimes
Murder 4,506,253 -373 -373 $1,683,083,243
Rape 132,938 347 1,559 -$207,270,899
Robbery 13,984 134 918 -$12,839,495
Assault 14,776 -7,798 -37,135 $548,690,721
Property Crimes
Burglary 1,471 -653 -9,467 $13,920,409
Larceny/Theft 295 -1,983 -35,105 $10,347,853
Motor Vehicle Theft 1,855 -1,355 -14,238 $26,414,558
Arson 58,171 -69 -469 $27,302,131
Total -11,750 -94,310 $2,089,648,519
Notes: These costs re°ect incarceration and victim costs. Victim costs are taken from Miller, et
al. (1996). Incarceration costs per crime equal the incarceration cost per inmate multiplied by the
incarceration rate for that crime (approximately $25,000). Incarceration rates by o®ense type are
calculated as the total number of individuals in jail or prison (from U.S. Department of Justice, 1994)
divided by the total number of o®enses that year (where the number of o®enses are adjusted for non-
reporting to the police). Incarceration costs per inmate are taken from U.S. Department of Justice
(1999). All dollar ¯gures are translated into 2008 dollars using the CPI-U. Source: Lochner and
Moretti (2004).